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INTR OD UC TION
The principal aim of this paper is to provide the reader
with an overview of the key legal considerations at play in
relation to European Union (EU) energy security. As part of
that process we explore the complexities that contribute to the
contentiousness of EU action in relation to certain aspects of
energy. We also provide some background information on key
facts and figures regarding energy in the EU.
While extensive literature exists on discrete aspects of the
EU-energy nexus, there is a lack of research contextualizing EU
energy security through a constitutional/ public law prism. We
therefore intentionally take a broad view of the subject. Such an
approach is relevant because of the very nature, on the one
hand, of the EU, and on the other, of energy, both of which are
highly complex. For instance, the EU is a complex sui generis
example of inter-state cooperation. For its part, energy-due to
inherent and contingent reasons explored below-is highly
politicized. Combining these two fields makes for potentially
very contentious politics. It follows, therefore, that a public law
approach in relation to the competences of the supranational
aspects of the EU-in other words, a clear delineation of the
competences of the EU and of its member states 1-would be
highly pertinent towards understanding energy within the EU
context.
We also aim to highlight in our present work the
inescapable diplomatic overtones of energy in international
relations. Although our focus is on the legal aspects of EU
energy security, we consider it necessary to outline what may be
the principal contours of the broader geostrategic dynamics at
play, including EU efforts to secure its energy supply. In that
respect, we support a view of international law as only an
aspect-albeit an important one-of the international rules-
1. For a discussion of supranratialism and the European Union, see Rafael Leal-
Arcas,Tleores ? Sp'anationalisim in the E , 8 J.L. SOC'Y 88 (2007).
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based system that seeks to discipline inter-state relations to the
extent that is politically acceptable to the state actors concerned.
That is to say that international law and its normative effect
ought not be seen as functioning in some geostrategic vacuum.
The EU extensively engages with the world that is external
to it. We see its sui juris and observer-status participation in
various international fora. This can encourage perceptions that
overestimate the EU's actual competence to speak and act with
one voice on all policy matters.2 In that sense, the question as to
the EU's actorness within the broader international
environment is part of its complexity. Whilst the EU certainly
possesses the institutional capacity to speak and act with one
voice on behalf of its member states, it lacks the absolute
discretion to do so in all fields of policy. What is more, a
complex policy matter such as energy needs to be broken down
into its various aspects in order for the EU to determine what
action might be acceptable in relation to each aspect. This shall
be explored more fully in this paper.
The EU is essentially about the common economic area
between twenty-eight sovereign states.3 The main features of that
common economic area are its customs union and internal
market. In matters directly linked to the customs union and the
competition rules of the internal market, EU members have
expressly endowed the EU with powers to exclusively handle
2. There is a large amount of literature on the EU acting with one voice on the
international stage. See generally RAFAEL LEAL-ARCAS, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EC
EXTERNAl. TRADE LAW AND POLICY (2008); Rafael Leal-Arcas, Unitapy Character of EC
External Trade Reations. 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 355 (2001); Rafael Leal-Arcas. United We
and,. Dividd We Fall- Te European Community and its Member States in the 1tO FOum:
Towards Greater Cooperation on Issues of Shared Competence?, 1 E R. POL. ECON. REV 65
(2003), available at http:/www.ugbs.org/'weru/cpcr,/voll/nol/cal.pdf: Rafael Leal-
Arcas, The EC in the GATT/110 negotiations: From Rone to Nice- Have EC Trade Policy
Reforns Been Good Enough for a Coherent EC Trade Policy in the WTO?, 8 EUR.
INTEGRATION ONLINL PAPLRS 1(2004) available at http://ciop.or.at/ciop/texte/2004-
001.htrn; Rafael Leal-Arcas, Polycephalous Anatomy oj the EC in the 110: An Analysis of
Law and Practice, 19 FLA.J. INT'L L. 569(2007).
3. The EU and the members (minus Switzerland) of the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA) form the European Economic Area (EEA). As a consequence, this
expanded free-trade area applies the entire EU internal market acquis comm)unautaire-
save for that on fisheries and agriculture. See Agrecmnent on the European Economic
Area, 1994 0.. L 1/3.
2013] 1227
1228 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 36:1225
such matters on their behalf.4 In other words, the EU acts to the
exclusion of member states. Member states foresaw that certain
other matters-supplementary to the EU project-made it
necessary for the EU to have a degree of competence to act.
These are considered shared competence areas. Generally, any
policy matter for which the treaties make no express provision
remains the sovereign preserve of member states.@ That said,
4. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 3, 2010 0.J. C 83/47. at 51 [hereinafter TFEU]. Article 3 states: "1. The
Union shall have exclusive competence in the following areas: (a) customs union; (b)
the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal
market; (c) monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the curo; (d) the
conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy (e)
common commercial policy. 2. The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the
conclusion of an international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a
legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal
competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their
scope."Id. Artice 6 similarly provides: "The Union shall have competence to carry out
actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States. The
areas of such action shall, at European level, be: (a) protection and improvement of
human health; (b) industry; (c) culture; (d) tourism; (e) education, vocational
training, youth and sport; () civil protection; (g) administrative cooperation."Jd. art. 6,
at 52-53.
5. Artidce 4 of the TFEU states: "1. The Union shall share competence with the
Member States where the Treaties confer on it a competence which does not relate to
the areas referred to in Ar ticles 3 and 6. 2. Shared competence between the Union and
the Member States applies in the following principal arcas:(a) internal market; (b)
social policy, for the aspects defined in this Treaty; (c) economic, social and territorial
cohesion; (d) agriculture and fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine biological
resources; (c) environment: (f) consumer protection; (g) transport; (h) trans-
European networks; (i) energy; (j) area of freedom, security and justice; (k) common
safety concerns in public health mattCrs, for the aspects defined in this Treaty. 3. In the
areas of research, technological development and space, the Union shall have
competence to carry out activities, in particular to define and implement programmes;
however, the exercise of that competence shall not result in Member States being
prevented from exercising thcirs.4. In the areas of development cooperation and
humanitarian aid, the Union shall have competence to carry out activities and conduct
a common policy; however, the exercise of that competence shall not result in Member
States being prevented from exercising theirs."Id. art. 4, at 51-52 (emphasis added).
6. Also in accordance to the interpretative principle of expresio un us et exclusio
alterius, that is to say that the express mention of a mattcr or circumstance has the
effect of excluding those not mentioned. This is an interprctative principle to assist in
deducing the scope of any given norm where textually this is unclear. The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treatics 1969 (VCLT) -drafted by the Intrinational Law
Commission pursuant to A ticle 13 of the United Nations' Charter to codify a complex
area of international law-signed and ratified by most of the 28 EU member states,
codifies norins concerned, amongst other things, with interpretative matters. See
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatics art. 26-38, May 23, 1969. 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter VCLT]. However, the fact that France and Romania-both EU members
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notably, the treaties foresee cases where, while no EU
competences exist, EU institutions may have to act, albeit to the
extent that member states unanimously consent to this.7 Of
course, there are matters over which both sets of actors-
namely, EU institutions and EU member states-may act. And in
relation to such matters, there are treaty-based solutions that
promote an efficient use of coexistent competences whilst
discouraging the unjustifiable sidelining of member states by EU
institutions.8
Returning to energy in its wide sense, what becomes evident
is that it is a multidimensional matter. The centrality of energy-
by which we mean its significance to almost every field of human
endeavor in modern times-is what makes it multidimensional.
For instance, the production, transport, distribution, sale, and
consumption of energy engage several policy areas. It is possible,
and parties to EU constitutive treaties-have neither signed nor ratified the V CLT
means that any interpretative dispute submitted to adjudication cannot be resolved on
the basis of the VCLT. Rather it would need to be resolved on the basis of customary
law. That said, for its most part, as expressed passin in the commentary to the draft
version of the VCLT, the VCLT is decined to mirror customary norms. In that respect,
the customary norins that were thought to exist are mirrored in Articles 26-38 of the
VCIT. Article 31, and its mirror norm in custom, focuses on the ordinary meaning of
the wording in question. In that respect, to read broader powers into a treaty provision
in dispute would be unjustifiable save for where some other legally significant event or
circumstance permits for this to happen. An example would be subsequent state
practice or international agreements that indicate that there is state consent to reading
broader powers into a treaty. See id. at art.30, 31(3)(a)&(b) (providing rules for
interpreting successive international agreements and subsequent agreement or practice
on the part of the states concerned, respectively).
7. Article 352(1) of the TFEU provides: "If action by the Union should prove
necessary, within the framework of the policies delined in the Treaties, to attain one of
the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the
Council, acting unanimyiously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining
the consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures. Where
the measures in question are adopted by the Council in accordance with a special
legislative procedure, it shall also act unanimously on a proposal from the Commission
and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. "TFEU, supra note 4, art.
352(1), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 196 (emphasis added).
8. Artice 5 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) limits the actions of the
EU to the extent that the EU has been conferred express treaty-derived powers to act
and to the extent that EU action is proportionate to the intended objective. In relation
to shared comptcences. Article 5 TEU conditions EU action according to the
subsidiarity principle-i.e., to the extent that action is more effective at the
supranational level in order to achieve what cannot be similarly achieved at a local,
regional, or national level. See The Treaty on European Union art. 5, 2010 OJ. C
83/13, at 18 [hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon].
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therefore, that certain aspects of energy within the EU context
are either a field where the EU has exclusive, shared or even no
competence. This shall be explored further below. What is
more, once a policy matter transcends the EU border, it
becomes internationalized. Here, too, the question in relation to
the EU's international activity-inextricable from that of its
competences-comes sharply into focus. Most energy-related
policy matters have become internationalized in the post-WXTII
era increasingly globalized world economy. In that respect, one
could sensibly segregate aspects of EU energy-related policy
matters into internal and external. This too shall be explored at
greater length below.
In terms of the concept of energy security, the literature is
diverse. Some regard this as an economic and even a security
matter. From the EU perspective, unsurprising given the EU's
energy-dependency, energy security is perceived from a szupply
security point of view. This is the notion we have espoused for
the purposes of this paper.' In relation to EU energy security, this
seems to engender all that could make EU energy policy
complex given that energy security is a matter that relies on
several factors for it to be achieved." Firstly, however, we must
be clear on what we mean by energy security. To answer this, we
need to understand to whom the benefits of energy security
accrue. For instance, if we were to answer this in connection to
the EU, we would claim that energy security means the steady
and secure access to energy supplies to meet the energy needs of
all 28 EU member states.'' It is also worth noting early on that
9. See DiciE KORKMAZ, INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DYNAMICS OF EU ROPEAN ENERGY
SECURITY 5-6 (2010), available at http:w//vvwjhubc.it/ecpr-porto/virtualpaperroom/
034.pdf (discussing relevant theorie s and literature on European energy security).
10. See Florian Baumann, Eu Way to Energy Security: The Outer Dinensions oj
EnerD SecuritY: From Power Politics to EnergD Governance, 15 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV.77, 87
(2010). Baumann states that: "The tiuth is that energy security includes multiple
concerns, including economics, politics, geopolitics, and diplomacy. Trading resources,
building pipelines, and investing in plants and infrastructures are absolutely economic
ventures but only as long as business can function without political intriference. When
the means of producing energy are subordinated to economic and ecological targets or
the access to energy is misused by international power politics, business alone will not
solve the problem." Id.
11. In fact this is what the initial set of ministers from six European states (namely,
the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands) had in mind when tLhey promulgated lhe Messina Declaration in 1955 in
which they stated that "Putting more abundant energy at a cheaper price at the disposal oj the
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the EU's origins partly lie in matters connected to energy
security.12 If we were then to supplement the question of what
energy security is within the EU context by asking who might be
a responsible or influential agent in fulfilling the objective of EU
energy security, we enter the complexity of energy within the EU
context. This is because to ask who is responsible engages the
question of competences (e.g., who does what and to what
extent), and to ask who is influential engages the question of
competences plus who possesses the diplomatic clout. The latter
becomes even more pronounced when we take into
consideration the disparate levels of influence between EU
member states. Again, these are issues we explore in the present
paper. Furthermore, within the EU context, energy security has
come to be heavily conditioned by environmental objectives with
the addition of 'sustainable' to the notion of EU energy
security.
As stated above, energy security relies on a variety of
factors-including efficient infrastructure and consumption,
and diversity of primary energy mix and supply-that, again,
European economies constitutes a fundamental element of economic progress. That is why
all arrangements should be made to develop suficient exchanges of gas and electric
power capable of increasing the profitability of investments and reducing the supply
costs. Studies will be undertaken of methods to co-ordinate development prospects for
the production and consumption of energy, and to draw up general guidelines for an
overall policy . . ." The 1955 Messina Declaration para. 5, June 3, 1955 (emphasis
added), available at http://wwwcurottreatLis.comn /messina.pdf. Clcarly the initial set of
European governments wvas well attuned to the importance of energy security to the
economic reconstruction of European economics in the postwar period.
12. Let us be reminded that the initial instances of European inter-sLtat
cooperation which eventually resulted in the remarkable international entity that is the
EU revolved around locking together French and German coal and steel resources. See
e.g., Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951. 261
U.N.T.S. 140; see also Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,
Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167. In 2007, the Commission reminded members and ElU
institutions to be faithful to the EU's roots: "Europe needs to act now, together, to
deliver sustainable, secure and competitive energy. In doing so the EU would return to
its roots...the founding Member States saw the need for a common approach to
energy." Comnunication from the Commission to the European Council and the
European Parliament: An Energy Policy for Europe, at 3, COM(2007) I final (Jan. 10,
2007) [hireinafter An Energy Policy for Europt].
13. This is a relatively novel development. See Communication from the
Commission: Europe 2020-A European Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive
Growth, at 22-34, COM (2010) 2020 final (Mar. 3, 2010) [hereinafter Europe 2020]
(presenting economic growth. climate change, and energy objectives as infterlinked and
mutually-conditional).
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illustrate how EU energy security may rely on action across the
EU policy spectrum and that engages the internal-external
cleavage. As we shall explore below, much has been done at the
intra-EU level to rationalize the energy market to the extent that
the Internal Energy Market (JEM) is heading towards
coherence.14 As we shall also explore below, much has been said
to make possible more cohesive external energy action. We
conclude however that so long as the constitutive treaties that
spell out EU competence upon which the EU lies are not
substantively amended, the furthest the EU could go in relation
to EU energy security is to act to the extent that the treaties
make possible-that is to say, to the extent that the EU has
powers to address some, albeit not all, key factors upon which
energy security relies. That said, it is our view that EU
institutions appear to be making full and very competent use of
the means at their disposal. For instance, the EU Commission
makes good use of its capacity to make recommendations to the
Council and the Parliament, and to also propose legislation
focused on enhancing EU energy relations and ultimately
energy security.
In sum, thcrefore, it is useful to conceptualize EU energy'
security primarily in relation to the structural challenges-
namely, the question of vires-that the EU faces when compared
to other prominent players on the international plane, e.g.,
sovereign actors such as China and the US. The energy markets
of the 28 EU member states vary widely in terms of, amongst
other things, infrastructure, investment, and pricing. The IEM is
not fully integrated; however, it is not far from achieving this in
relation to electricity and gas. What is more, the EU has
14. The EU is committed to lully integrating the electricity and gas markets of the
28 member states by 2014 into the Internal Energy Market (lEM). See Communication
from the Commission to the EuIropean Pariament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions, Energy Roadmap 2050, at 19,
COM(2011) 885 final (Dec. 15 2011) [heiinafter Energy Roadmap 2050]. For a useful
historical analysis of the IEM and the integration of the US markets and an
examination of the regulatory regimes in the EU and the US, see Giuseppe
Bellantuono, Contract Law, Regulation and Competition in Energy M4arkets, 10
COMPLTITION & RLGUIATION IN NETWORK INDUS. 159 (2009). According to
Bellantuono, EU and US energy markets have shifted from monopolistic towards
competitive. The EU energy markets started shifting towards integration in earnest
from around the beginning of the 2000s whilst this happened around the 1980s in the
United States.
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strategically promoted the integration of energy markets and
regulatory convergence with bordering third party states,
through the medium of rational markets, to the end of its own
energy security. This is also explored below. In that respect,
perhaps what has so far been achieved in terms of the
promotion of EU energy security is optimal, given the
circumstances.
The paper is divided into six sections. After the
introduction, Section 11 provides facts and figures to put EU
energy consumption and production into context. Section III
analyzes the legal aspects of EU energy policy, focusing on the
changes brought by the Treaty of Lisbon and the challenges the
EU faces when aiming for a common energy security policy,
while Section IV provides an analysis of the Internal Energy
Market and the Energy Community. Section V analyzes the
nexus between EU energy policy and foreign policy. It explains
the effects of shale gas extraction on EU energy security. It also
explains EU external energy relations at large. Section VI
concludes the paper.
II. ENERGYAND THE EU FACTS AND FIGURES PUT INTO
CONTEXT
A. Energy Consumption in the EU
In 2009, EU consumption stood at 1,703 Mtoe, 3 7 % of
which was produced from oil, 24% from gas, 16% from coal,
14% from nuclear energy and only 9% (almost a tenth) from
renewable energy sources15. These figures indicate that 77% of
EU energy consumption derives from traditional energy
sources-namely, hydrocarbons/fossil fuels-that are highly
polluting. This is a reality with significant implications as it poses
dilemmas for the EU in terms of balancing its energy security
objectives against its aspirations to robustly protect the
environment. 16 Although this figure (namely, 7 7 %) is marginally
15. EUROPEAN COMM'N, Key Figures, Market Observatory for Energy, Directorate-
General for Energy, at 11, (June 2011) [hereinafter Key Figures].
16. For an earlier study on the broader link between energy and the environment,
see Lakshinan GuruswamLy, Energ and Environment Security: The Need for Action, 3 J
ENLi L 209 (1991).
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lower than the global figure17, it remains problematic given the
urgency with which the degradation of the ecosystem ought to
be handled by the international community including the EU.
Currently, just 9% of EU energy consumption derives from
renewable energy sources 8 . The EU has committed to
increasing the share of renewables in the EU's final energy
consumption to 20% by 2 02019, and it is not clear whether it
would be able to meet this goal within the timeframe. Given the
pressing realities of climate change, and their implications for
human populations2o and the ecosystem at large, it would be
most unfortunate for the EU to miss this target.21 Incidentally, in
2009 EU investments in renewables dropped by 10% whilst they
rose by 50% in China. Still, the EU remains the investor par
excellence in renewables given that during 2009 there were EU
investments around USD 43 billion in renewables, whilst
investments in China stood at around USD 24 billion.2
Currently, the EU renewable energy industry has a £20 billion
17. During 2011, c. 81% of global energy consumption cane fron
hydrocarbons/fossil fuels. This figure represents 10,689 Mtoe out of a total 12,274
Mtoc. The actual breakdown is 4,059 Mtoe/c.3 3 %( from oil, 2905.6 Mtoc/c.24( from
gas, and 2.724.3 Mtoc/c.30% from coal. See BP Statistical Review of World Energy, at 40-41
(June 2012) available atwNy.bp.com/statisticalreview.
18. Key Figures supra note 15 at 11.
19. Communication from the Commission: Europe 2020-A European Strategy for Smart,
Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, supra note 13 at 32; see also Council Directive
2009/28/E( of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the
Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources and Amending and
Subsequently Repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, 2009 (.J. (L 140),16
(E() [hereinafter Energy from Renewable Sources Directive] (repealing Directive
2001/77/E() article 3 of which mandates minimum national targets that ought to be
met in order for the EU to achieve its target; namely, to derive 20% of its final energy
consumption from renewable energy sources (RES) by 2020. Annex I of Directive
2009/28/E( expressly states the national targets with regard to the energy realities that
each member state faces. E.g., Belgium is bound to increase its RES from 2.2% in 2005
to 13% by 2020 whilst Sweden is bound to increase this from 39.8% to 49%.
20. See e.g., Rafael Leal-Arcas, On Climate Migration and International Trade" 6
Viennajournal of International Constitutional Law 410, issues 3-4, (2012).
21. On the rolk of the EU in climate change negotiations, see Rafael Leal-Arcas.
The Role of the EU the US, and China in Addressing Climate Change, in THE EU AND THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS 221 (Finn Laursen ed., 2012);
Rafael Leal-Arcas, The Role of the European Union and China in Global Climate Change
Negotiations: A Critical Analysis, 18J. EUR. INTEGRATION HIST. 67 (2012).
22. Key Figures, supra note 15, at 30.
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turnover and employs about 300,000 people amounting to
roughly 60% of the global market share.23
Whilst the EU consumes about 1,703 Mtoe of energy,
during 2009 only 48% (818 Mtoe) of its total energy needs was
produced within the EU. Consequently, it relies on energy
imports to meet 52% of its energy needs-in that respect it is
energy dependent by 52%.24 The specific realities of each member
state's energy dependency are hugely disparate as we see below.
What is more, EU energy dependency varies depending on the
energy resource in question. For example the EU imports 83.5%
of its oil, 64% of its gas, and circa 38% of its coal.25 Furthermore,
about 50% and 80% of EU oil and gas imports, respectively,
come from only four countries: namely, Algeria, Libya, Norway
and Russia.2 6 One third of those gas imports-34%-comes from
Russia.27
Tabhl< I. ()1lignt oFU Hi (1al (..as Imports IDiniing 20m
K,3Vm( (usi 31'm Nmoi\fi1 i-\T 0
Also, it is helpful to understand EU energy consumption
against the backdrop of global consumption figures. The EU has
steadily consumed roughly circa 1,700 Mtoe of energy since
1990, and projections suggest that its annual consumption is
likely to stay at that level over the next two decades.28 EU energy
23. See An Energy Policy for Europe, supra note 12, at 4. For further details on
funding renewablc encrgy in the Euro-Meditcrrancan rcgion, sce generally STMONE
TA(GLIAPILTRA, THE GEOLCONOMICS OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND RENEWABLE
ENERGY: TOWARDS A NEW ENERGY PARADIGM IN THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN REGTON
(2012).
24. Key Figures, supra note 15 at 5.
25. Id. at 6.
26. Id. at 7.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 3.
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consumption composes about 14% of global consumption=2
however, given that its rate of consumption is held to remain
static over the next two decades whilst global demand is set to
rise significantly, the share of EU consumption in relation to
global energy consumption is set to drop to circa 10% by 2035.30
The rest of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD)-that is to say, the other states in the
OECD that are not EU members-is also set to consume at the
same rate it has done historically, whilst the greatest increase in
global energy demand between now and 2035 (namely, from
circal2,000 Mtoe to 18,000 Mtoe) will happen due to the
increasing energy needs of China, India, and the rest of the
world consequent to their further industrialization."I Based on
these figures, by 2035, the EU and the rest of its OECD peers are
likely to collectively account for about 30% of global energy
demand, whilst China and the rest of the world for about 70%.32
What these dwindling figures might also reflect is the waning
influence of the EU over the coming decades in relation to its
environmental agenda. To say the least, this would be
unfortunate, given the EU's more robust approach to
environmental protection.A If the EU's voice in the global arena
29. See BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2012, 1, http://www.bp.com/
assets/ bpinternet/globalbp/globalbp-ukcnglish i/reports-and publications/
statistical-energy-review 2011/STA(IN(local-assets/pdf/
statistical review of worildcncergyfill-report_2012.pdf (last visited May 28, 2013)
(calculating 12,274 Mtoc global total energy consumption. and 1690.7 Mtoc EU total
energy consumption).
30. This is based on the assumption that global energy demand is Set to rise to
circa 18.000 Mtoe by 2035. by which time EU energy demand is likely to remain static
to around the 1,700 Mtoe mark. See Key Figaures, supra note 15 at 3.
31. Id. Further, in relation to China and India, the International Energy Agency
(IEA) projects that India and China would account for roughly 45% of the anticipated
increase in global energy consumption between 2005 and 2035. See INT'L ENEREY
AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OU TL00K 2007: EXEC -TIV S NIMARY: CHINA AND INDIA
INSIGHTS 3 (2007), available at http://www.ica.org/Textbase/npsum/
WEO2007SUM.pdf.
32. EU and rest of the OECD are likely to account for just under 6,000 Mtoe out
of the global energy demand figure of 18,000 Mtoc by 2035. See Key Figures, supra note
15 at 3.
33. This shall be explored in a separate part of this paper; however, it is worth
briefly mentioning the EU's Emissions Trading System and its expanding application
over all major polluting industries within EU territory. Also, it is worth mentioning that
the EU appears to constram its pursuit of energy security by environmental objectives,
which, when compared to other players ifternationally-namnely, China, India, Japan,
and the US-might in the long-run place the EU in an economically disadvantaged
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were to be further weakened, it seems unlikely that any other
state, or bloc of states,34 would take on the responsibility in
earnest to call for more robust action to protect the ecosystem.
As briefly mentioned above, whilst overall EU energy
dependency across its primary energy mix stands at around 52%,
the situation varies widely in relation to each EU member state.
For instance, Denmark is entirely energy import independent
whilst Malta is entirely energy import dependent.35 In terms of
oil, Denmark is entirely oil independent, given that it is the only
EU member state that is a net oil exporter. The next
comparatively better off EU member is the United Kingdom
(UK) as it is 9% oil dependent, followed by a very distant third,
Romania, which is circa 50% oil dependent. All other EU
members' oil dependency ranges from circa 63% to 100%.
Predictably, such acute disparities, along with other differences
between EU member states, have implications for cohesive EU
action. This shall be explored more fully in Section V, where we
explore the various attitudes of EU member states towards
energy cooperation with partners such as Russia, and how
differences affect chances for cohesive EU action regarding
energv.
In terms of how total EU energy consumption is broken
down, roughly, 33% goes on transport, 27% on households, 24%
on industry, 12% on services, and 2% on agriculture."8 From this
position. These concerns were echoed by Saryusz-Wolski, the European Parliament's
Committee for Foreign Affairs (AFET) Rapportcur, in his concluding address during a
November 2012 workshop on the EU's '2050 Energy Roadnap' organized by the
European Parliament's Directorate-General for External Policies, in which he also
stated that: "Energy policy should be viewed as a policy on its own, and not as a by-product of
climate poic." DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTLRNAL POLICIES. POL. DLP'T, Enery
Roadmap 2050: EU External Policies for Future Energy Security, Workshop, at 15,
EXPO/B/ AFET/FWCX(/2009-01/Lotl/42 [hereinafter Energ Roadmap Workshop].
34. With the exception of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and those
other states especially affected by further environmental degradation such as
desertification and so on. However, such States fail to garner the levyl of influence that
the EU currently has and that it is likely to have in the future despite its potentially
waning influence.
35. Key Figures supra note 15, at 8.
36. Id. at 9.
37. See generally Richard A. Leibert, The War on Energy: Why the United States and the
International Community need Cohesive Energy Infrastructure Security Policy, 29 HOLS.
INTL L.453 (2007).
38. Key Figures, supra note 15, at 14.
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breakdown we can deduce that energy price volatility coupled
with weather-induced increased energy consumption could have
considerable implications for the economy and human welfare.
For instance, higher energy prices add to industry costs that, in
turn, may lead to EU-produced services and goods becoming
less competitive in relation to like products produced in
economies where energy costs are lower. " Furthermore, as
households account for 27% of EU energy consumption, price
increases would eat into household disposable income that, in
turn, could, potentially depress consumption rates and thus
affect the entire EU economy.40 In that respect, setting aside the
environmental imperatives, promoting a paradigm shift from
hydrocarbons-on which the EU is hugely externally
dependent-to renewables could potentially immunize the EU
considerably from such shocks.
It is interesting to read the above breakdown of EU energy
consumption against the backdrop of overall EU C02 emissions.
The energy industries produce 35% of EU C02 emissions,
closely followed by transport at 30%, industry and construction
at 18%, and residential use at 11% of EU C02 emissions.4 1 In
that respect, one could argue that action be largely targeted at
the most polluting sectors. However, as we shall see below, given
that the situation is disparate between EU member states, a
more variegated approach would be necessary when, for
instance, we look at the energy industries across the EU.
Electricity is produced in a more environmentally damaging way
in Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, and Poland than it is, say, in Sweden
and the Netherlands.
39. See, e.g., Vitaliy Pogoretskyy & Daniel Behn, The Tension between Trade
Liberalization and Resource Sovereignty Russia-EU Energy Relatios and h Problem oj
Natural Gas Dual Pricing, 9 OIL, GAS & ENERGY L., no. 6 (2011) (analyzing Russia's dual
pricing practice of gas against the strictures of the W-1O and in relation to the tension
between sovereignty prerogatives and trade liberalization objectives). In the article, the
authors refer to EU commission countervailing action in response to what it considers
to be energy subsidies on the part of the Russian state to its domestic industries.
40. Energy costs are likely to increase so that households end up spending up to
16% of incone on energy-including transport related energy-by 2030. This figure is
likely to drop to 15% by 2050. See Energy Roadimap 2050, supra note 14, at 7.
41. Key Figares. supra note 15, at 25.
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B. Energy Production in the EU
As briefly mentioned above, during 2009 the EU met 48%
of its energy needs from its own energy production. That is 818
Mtoe out of the 1,703 consumed that year. Sixty-six percent of
EU energy production comes from just five EL members states:
namely the UK, France, Germany, Poland, and the
Netherlands.42 The breakdown in relation to the 818 Mtoe
figure, which represents the amount of EU produced energy
during 2009, is the following: 28% from nuclear power, 19%
from gas, 13% from oil, 20% from coal, and 18% from
renewables. HWhen comparing these figures to those of 1990, we
witness that the share of coal in EU energy production dropped
from 39% to 20%, the share of nuclear power increased from
22% to 28%, and reliance on renewables also increased from 7%
to 18%," However, this should be understood against the fact
that EU energy production in 1990 was higher-namely, 943
Mtoe-largely due to greater use of coal back then.44 This
illustrates the current trade-off between, on the one hand,
environmental protection objectives and, on the other, the
pursuit of energy security that, for the most part, relies on
hydrocarbons.
As we have stated, the situation between EU members is
disparate not least in relation to their reliance on renewable
energy. For instance, the most exemplary are Austria, Latvia,
and Sweden in that 68%, 65% and 58% of their respective
electricity needs in 2009 came from renewables at a time that
the EU average was circa 18%.45
When it comes to nuclear power-which, whilst less
polluting than hydrocarbons in terms of C02 and other
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, is also harmful to the
ecosystem-the situation is also disparate between ELU members.
France leads with 7 6 % of its electricity derived from nuclear
power, followed by Lithuania and Slovakia at 70% and 55%
respectively, whilst the Netherlands derives less than 4% of its
electricity from nuclear power.46
42. Id. at 18.
43. Id. at 16.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 20.
46. Id. at 21.
2013] 1239
1240 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 36:1225
Several EU states derive more than 50% of their electricity
production from gas. For instance, Luxembourg produces 7 4 %
of its electricity from gas, the Netherlands about 63%, Ireland
about 57%, and Italy about 53%, whilst Sweden, Slovenia, and
Poland produce about 2%, 3%, and 4%, respectively."
At the most polluting end of the spectrum is electricity
generated by coal and oil. Poland and Estonia derive about 87%
and 86%, respectively, of their electricity from coal. The Czech
Republic, Greece, Bulgaria, and Denmark derive approximately
57%, 56%, 48%, and 47%, of their respective electricity
production from coal.48 1n terms of electricity produced by oil,
Malta and Cyprus derive almost 100% of their electricity from
oil, whilst the rest of the ELU members deriving between circa
17% and 1% of their electricity needs from this energy source.49
C. Energy Pricing in the EU
In terms of energy prices and taxation, again, the situation
is quite uneven.50 For instance, pricing and taxation may vary
along several cleavages-e.g., according to energy source and
from sector to sector within a national economy, and across the
EU membership. For example, during the second semester of
2010 the highest electricity prices for households were in
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, and
Sweden, whilst the highest electricity prices for industry were in
Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Sweden)' In
terms of taxation for household-destined electricity, it is around
the 15% mark in Ireland, Malta, and the UK, whilst it is around
the 35% mark in Denmark, Germany, and Portugal. Taxation
for industry-destined electricity is around the 15% mark in
Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, and Portugal, whilst it is around
the 35% mark in Denmark and Germany.5
47. Id. at 22.
48. Id. at 23.
49. Id. at 24.
5o. See, e.g., EUROPE'S ENEREN PORTAL, http:/,/vw7 .energy.eu (last visited May 28,
2013) (providing energy facts and prices across the EU).
51. Key Figures. supra note 15, at 34-35.
52. Id. at 38.
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D. Overall Energy Challenges in the EU
The purpose of this section has been to provide insights
into how disparate energy realities are across the bloc of 28
states. These realities are important given that considerations
specific to a particular EU member might be the driving factors
behind the policies that member would want to promote at the
EU level. It might be more difficult to persuade EU member
states that heavily rely on energy sources other than gas and oil
to support a common EU position aimed at more
institutionalized relations with gas and oil behemoths such as
Russia, other members of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS)," and of states across the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) region. For instance, states that derive a large
share of their electricity from coal might be indifferent, or in
some cases, opposed to deeper EU-Russia economic integration.
In the case of Poland and the Baltic states, for example, this
could be compounded by historic animosity towards whom they
regard to be the successor to Imperial Russia and the Soviet
Union rather than to be the most important EU energy partner.
On the other hand, it might be in the national interest of those
highly reliant on gas imports for their electricity, e.g.,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands, to promote a more strategic
approach. 4
All the above instances of divergence between EU member
states present a situation that makes cohesive policymaking
more difficult than it would be in a fully confederated system
charged with the external relations of the whole (e.g., Germany,
Switzerland, and the United States), not simply due to EU
structural/ vires issues but also due to the highly divergent
53. The CIS is a loose, quasi-economic association of independent States following
the dissolution of the USSR. its membership includes Azerbaijan. Armenia. Belarus.
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and
Ukraine. International agreements have been signed within its auspices towards the
progressive developnint of a free-trade area between parts of. or its entire,
membership. See INTERSTATE STATISTICAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMONWALTTH OF
INDLPLNDLNT STATLS, http://ww,.cisstat.com/cng/cis.hti (last visited May 28, 2013).
54. See BENELLUx ECO.NOMI(C UNION, ENLRGY SLCURITY & FOREIGN POLICY 2(2006).
The tripartite bloc of EU states urges the European Council to provide the steer for
nore cohesive EU common external relations that enhance the EU's energy security
through a multiplicity of approaches, including encouraging Russia to ratify the Encrgy
Charter Treaty.
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infrastructural, economic, regulatory, and diplomatic climates
that exist from EU member state to member state.
In this respect, it may be helpful to think of the EU to be:
- a fully federated entity solelT in relation to policy areas in
which it has exclusive competence;5
- a loosely federated entity for shared competence policy
fields in which the central authority (the EU institutions) must
ensure that it develops policy to the extent acceptable to the
constituent elements (the member states) of the federated entity
(the EU) ;5
- an association of states for policy areas that fall outside
both exclusive and shared competence EU remits. 7
This shall also be explored in Section III concerned with
the legal aspects of the EU and its energy policy capacity.
An EU member's position essentially seeks to capture the
interplay of considerations at the national level that arise in
relation to each EU member's economic, political, and historical
tradition. An EU member's position, in turn, interplays with
those of its peers before, if ever, an EU common position is
finally adopted.58 All this makes a cohesive EU energy security
policy particularly sticky to achieve.
55. See TFEU, supra note 4, art. 3, 2010 0.J. C 83, at C83/51 (listing areas where
the EU has exclusive competence).
56. Id. art. 4, at C 83/51.
57. See RFAEL LLAL-ARCAS, supra note 2. at 86-89. (discussing the anatomical
structure of the EU).
58. Such modus operandi reminds us of EU trade policy-making in the pre-Lisbon
Treaty cra. See id. chs. 3-6; Rafael Leal-Aicas, The EUDecision-AIaking Process in EC Trade
Polic: The Three Internal Tensions, in A CONSTITUTION FOR EiUROPE? GOVERNANCE AND
POoICY-MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, Vol. II, 132 (Francesca Astengo & Nanette
Neuwah! eds., 2004); Rafael Leal-Aicas, The EU Constitutional Treaty and International
Trade, in THE RISE AN) FALL OF THE EU'S CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY 25(Finn ILaursen,
ed., 2008); Rafael Leal-Arcas, Exclusive or Shared Competence in the Common Com mercial
Policy: From Amsterdam to Nice, 30 LLGAL ISSUES OF' ECON. INTEGRATION 3(2003);Rafacl
Leal-Arcas, The State Of Play oj the ECs Common Commercial Policy: A Legal And Poliy
Analysis, 11 TI BURG FOREIGN L. REV. 537 (2003); Rafael Leal-Arcas, The EC in the 170:
The Three-Level Game of Decision-Making. What Multilateralism Can Learn from Regionalism,
8 EUR. INTEGR[ATION ONLINE IAPERS No. 14 (Sept. 2004), available at http://eiop.or.at/
ciop/textc/2004-014.htm; Rafael Leal-Arcas. The EU Institutions and Their Modus
Operandi in the World Trading System, 12 COLUI.J. ELR. L. 125 (2006); RaFael Lal -Arcas,
Is EC Trade Poliy Up to Par?: A Legal Analysis Over Time-Rome. Marakesh, Amsterdam,
Nice, and the Constitutional Treats, 13 COLUI. J. ELR. L. 305 (2007); Rafael Leal-Aicas,
Will EU Member States Play Any Role at the WTO after the EU Reform Treaty, 1 VIENNA.J.
INT'I. CONST. L., 75 (2007); Rafael Leal-Arcas, 50 Years of Trade Polic: Good Enough or (is
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In sum, the EU faces structural limitations in sui jires
promulgating a comprehensive energy strategy, quite unlike
how a sovereign actor would. This is due to the multifaceted
nature of energy that leads to certain aspects of energy falling
within the exclusive or shared competence remit of the EU
whilst other aspects of energy sit squarely with member states.
Even where matters sit with the EU, there are other issues-e.g.,
how a decision might be adopted-that are capable of
complicating or even stalling the adoption of a common
position.
III. LEGAL ASPECTS OFEUENERGY POLICY
We have briefly referred to the sui generis character of the
EU. Although apt historical precedents do not seem to exist,5
some parallels have been drawn to Germany, Italy, and the US
during, in the case of the first two, their unificatory/ nationalist
geneses, and in the case of the latter, its secessionist genesis "o
Also, parallels have been drawn to the Canadian model in terms
of how EU member states seem to interact with the overarching
EU order.61 What the EU has achieved is to create a core of
Good as it Gets?, 15 IRISH J. EUR. L. 157(2008); Rafael Leal-Arcas, Reflections on EU
International Trade Law: An Introspective View. 7 FRONTIERS L. CHINA 1 (2012).
59. The EU is quite unlike any other structure that historically has ever existed.
See PHIIPPE SANDS, LA WI ESS WORID: THE WHISTIE F llOWING ACCOUNT OF How 1tUSH
AND BLAIR ARE TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR OWN HANDS 101 (2006). Philippe Sands
informs us that: "The most highly integrated regional system is that between the EU's
twenty-five [at that timie] members. [The EU] . . . originally intended to remove
barriers to trade, it soon became clear that creating a common market necessarily
meant addressing other standards which would affect flows of goods and services and
the free movement of people. Gradually standards were developed on everything from
labour to the environment, from agriculture to competition rules. The original six
became the nine ... the nine became ten and then twelve, and then fifteen [and so
on]." Id.
60. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMTS OF INTLRNATIONAL LAw
5 (2005) ("Many scholars view European Union integration as a possible model for a
more ambitious public international law. Although the EU project is in some respects
constituted by international law, we think it is more usefully viewed as an example of
multi-state unification akin to pre-twentieth century unification efforts in the United
States (which, during its Articles of Confederation period, was viewed by some as a
fcdcration governed by international law),Germany, and Italy.").
61. Within the EU context, states have been likened to Canadian Provinces vis-a-
vis their relationship with the federal order. See e.g., SANDS, supra note 59, at 102
(deducing this view from the pleadings of the UK government in the 2003 Permanent
Court of Arbitration 'MOX PLANT' case between Ireland and the UK).
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states that had historically-in their previous configurations-
been belligerent towards each other. This core, in turn,
attracted the polities of smaller states at the periphery into an
economic order within which it is unimaginable for armed
conflict to break out. In that respect, this order of sovereign
equals-deeply tied together economically through buy-in
rather than military force-has been quite unlike any other
historical precedents of empire, and comes the closest to the
Kantian ideal of a peaceful universalism.62
What ought to surely set the EU apart from all
confederated examples is its limited capacity to represent-
through its institutions-its member states across the entire
policy spectrum. In other words, its limited vires-as opposed to
institutional-capacity to handle the foreign relations of EU
members to their exclusion. That said, the EU is endowed with
powers to act in its own right and to the exclusion of EU
members-including to contract with third party states and
other international organizations(-in matters that fall squarely
within its exclusive, yet limited, competence remit.64 However, it
should be borne in mind that these powers derive from treaties
contracted by sovereign actors who, at any time, may potentially
withdraw in accordance with international law, and,
consequently, re-assume full sovereign control over such aspects
of policy that are currently within the EU's exclusive
competence remit.
A. Debate on Competences in Energy Policy
Returning to the question of EU powers to handle external
energy relations, it may be helpful to approach this through a
series of assessments: firstly, it would be necessary to assess
whether an energy-related proposal in question falls within the
62. Immanuel Kant laid out the case for an international league of democracies
governed by the rule of law in his essays. See IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE: A
PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH (2003); IMMANUEL KANT, IDEA FOR A UNIVERSAL HISTORY WITH
A COSMOPOLITAN PURPOSE (1970).
63. See generally J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: DO THE NEW
CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR? AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTLGRATION (1999)
(providing a lill exposition of the legal position in relation to the possibility of the
concurrent international treaty-making capacities of two different agents such as a
central atlhority-c.g., the EU-and its constituent parts-c.g., EU icimber staCs).
64. TFEU, supra note 4, art. 3, 2010 O.J. C 83, at CS3/51.
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exclusive or the shared competence remit of the EU. Should it
unequivocally fall within the former category, the EU would
enjoy unbridled powers to pursue the external aspects of the
energy-related policy proposal in question. Should the energy-
related policy fall within the latter category, it would then be
necessary to then assess how the proposal ought to be decided at
the EU level-that is to say, whether it engages such matters that
the Council of the European Union@6 may have to decide
unanimously or by majority in order for an EU policy to be
adopted.
Article 192§2(c) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU) refers to the vires of the Council to
seek to legislate or take measures that significantly affec a
member state's choice between different energy sources and the
general structure of its energy supply. We witness a high degree
of incursion by the supranational into the national sphere.
However, Article 192§2 introduces safeguards by making clear
that decision-making by the Council under Article 192§2(c)
must be reached in the Council on the basis of unanimity and
not by qualified majoritV.66
What this might inldicate is that, in the final analysis, crucial
energy security related measures with strong diplomatic
overtones such as measures that, if taken, affect rather
significantly a member state's choice between what energy
sources it may use, or how the general structure of its energy
supply ought to be-remain firmly with member states given the
65. This is a key institution of the EU composed of 28 ministers whose
composition alters according to the policy matter at hand. E.g., Ministers with
responsibility for agriculture meet within the EU context to decide a particular EU-
wide agricultural policy. This is an important institution in that, alongside the EU
Parliament through a co-decision process, may adopt kgislation. Hereinafter we shall
refer to it as the 'Council'. It should not be confused with the European Council (i.e.,
the configuration of the 28 heads of State/government), which is the supreme political
body within the EU. The European Council-technically, in its alter ego, namely, the ad
hoc summit gathering of heads of state/government-is the body that contracts the
treaties upon which the EU rests.
66. Council decision-making based on the qualified majority voting procedure is
the norin, unless stated to the contri ary, under Artidce 238 of the TFEU. See TFEU, supra
note 4, art. 238, 2010 0.J. C 83, at C 83/153-54. See also TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 8,
art. 16, 2010 0.J. C 83/13. at 24. From November 2014, qualified majority shall mean at
least 55' of Council members representing a[ least 65% of [he EU population or 72%
of Council members representing at least 65% depending on circumstances. Id.
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unanimity requirement in such cases. In effect, this preserves
certain sovereign prerogatives of member states.
If we take as an example Directive 2009/28/EC,67 we note
in its preamble that this instrument was adopted in accordance
with Articles 95, 175§1, and 251 of the Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community (EEC Treaty).68 Having regard
to Articles 175 § 1 and 251, which are cited in this Directive,
decisions were adopted within the Council on the qualified
majority decision-making procedure. This is interesting, given
that Directive 2009/28/EC sets, amongst other things,
mandatory national targets for the overall share of renewables in
a member state's final consumption@1 which could be
interpreted as significantly affecting a member state's choice of
energy sources. However, it might have been the view of Council
members that the interference was not so significant as to invoke
the unanimity-based decision-making process. 70
As we shall see further down, EU energy policy is
multifaceted. Its introspective aspects have been adopted to,
amongst other things, integrate the IEM in terms of gas and
electricity, and to promote energy efficiency and the use of
renewables. There is sufficient legal basis within the treaties-
namely, the TFEU -for the EU to take action, e.g., by
promulgating policy, to handle aspects of the IEM. Conceivably,
creating an effective IEM also rests on a degree of regulatory
convergence across the EU. Under the TFEU,71 the EU may
67. Energy from Renewable Sources Directive, supra note 19.
68. The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community ("EEC Treaty")
was amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, which was signed on December 13, 2007, in
Lisbon and which entered into force on December 1, 2009, embracing a revised Treaty
on European Union (TEU) and a revised Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, which would be called a Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU). Consequently, Articles 95. 175. and 251 of the EEC Treaty became
Articles 114. 192, and 294 TFEU. Do note. however, that when Directive 2009/28/EC
was concluded (April 2009), it was done on the basis of the FEC Treaty, which was
applicable at the time. Furthermore, this Directive also cites the Kyoto Protocol to the
UNFCCC in rclation to the EU's international obligations, and those of its member
states, under that instrument.
69. Energy from Renewable Sources Directive, supra note 19 art. 1.
70. This seems to be the case when one notices that the national targets are
calculated on factors that take into account national iigures around energy
consumption thus applying a variegated regime rather than seeking to enforce a
uniform target on all members alike. See id. art. 5.
71. SeeTFEU, supra note 4, art. 114, 2010 0.J. C 83, at C 83/5 1.
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legislate to such an end. However, whether either the qualified
majority vote or the unanimity-based Council decision-making
process applies depends on which matters are being considered
for convergence. The language of the relevant provisions do not
make it an easy task to ascertain which decision-making process
applies, given how nuanced it appears to be. To make this clear,
let us look at Articles 114 and 115 TFEU. Article 115 states that
the Council in unanimity may adopt such measures for the
approximation of laws across the EU in relation to matters that
directly affect the establishment or functioning of the internal
market, whilst, under Article 114, the Council may decide on the
qualified-majority basis for measures for the approximation of
laws that have as their object the establishment or functioning of
the internal market. Here we witness the cleavage in EU law and
policy making in relation to Council decision-making
procedures. Furthermore, the TFEU contains the legal basis for
the integration of energy infrastructure and the development of
EU-wide energy infrastructure.2
The evolution of the EU involves two directions: the
widening (enlargement) and the deepening (greater
integration) of the Union. The institutional challenges that this
phenomenon engenders have eventually pushed EU member
states to seriously consider ways of consolidating and
rationalizing the EU processes. To that end, the Treaty
Establishing a Constitution for Europe" was proposed but
eventually defeated in France and the Netherlands by popular
referenda in 2005, despite having been ratified by more than 15
EU member states.
The Treaty of Lisbon (ToL)74 is a replacement for the EU
Constitutional Treaty,75 since the latter failed ratification.
72. See TFEU, supra note 4 art. 170, 2010 0.J. C 83, at C 83/124-25 (dealing wvith
the trans-European networks (TEN), including for energy (TEN-E)).
73. This proposed Treaty, commonly referred to as European Constitution, is an
uniniplemented Treaty which was signed in Roie in 2004 by the representatives of the
25 (at the time) EU Member States. but failed to be unanimously ratified as the
populations of France and the Netherlands rejected the Treaty in referenda. Following a
period of reflection given this initial defeat, the European Council met again in June
2007 and initiated negotiations on a draft to replace the failed form of the
Constitutional Treaty. A revised and substantially reduced version of that Treaty (from
then on referred to as the Reforim Treaty or Lisbon Treaty) was signed in Lisbon in
December 2007 and entered into force on 1 December 2009.
74. The Treaty of Lisbon, 2007 O.J. C 306 [hereinafter lisbon Treaty].
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Because the EU Constitutional Treaty did not enter into force,76
and after a political agreement was reached at the European
Council meeting of June 2007, the Portuguese Presidency of the
EU launched an intergovernmental conference for the
negotiation of a fall-back revision treaty, i.e., the Treaty of
Lisbon, on 23 July 2007, embracing a revised Treaty on
European Union (TEU) and a revised European Community
Treaty, which would be called a Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (TFEU).7 Much if not all of the content of
the new Treaties was agreed at the European Council meeting in
Brussels in June 2007. In theory therefore, this
intergovernmental conference was meant to be less controversial
than its predecessors, which led to the Single European Act and
the Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice Treaties,78 as well as the
75. Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2004 O.J. C 310/1 (never
ratiiled) [hereinafter Draft Constitutional Treaty].
76. Before the European Council of June 2007, the idea was that when the EU
Constitutional Treaty would enter into force, the EC Treaty, the EU Treaty, as well as
acts and Treaties which have supplemented or amended them, would have been
repealed. as laid down in the general and final provisions in Part IV of the EU
Constitutional Treaty. The EU Constitutional Treaty was supposed to enter into force
after ratification by all EU Member States. It was also provided for that the Union
would succeed to all the rights and obligations, whether internal or resulting from
international agreements. which arose before the entry into force of the EU
Constitutional Treaty. The case law of the European Court of justice (EC) would have
been maintained as a source of Union law interpretation. See id., art 1-6, at 12 (stating
that the Constitution and law adopted by the Union's institutions in exercising
competences conferred on it would have had primacy over the law of the Member
States).
77. The intergovernmental conference (IGC) mandate also provided in its
paragraph 22 that "a Protocol annexed to the Reform Treaty will amend the existing
Protocols, as agreed in the 2004 IG(" (including the deletion of 10 of them). See
Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions. Concl. 2, 11177/1/07 Rev. 1,
Annex I, para. 22 (June 21-22, 2007).
78. At present, the EU is founded on big and complex treaties that lay down the
rules by which it has to operate. EU lcaders intended to replace the EU's basic treatics
with a single, shorter, simpler document spelling out the EU's purposes and aims and
stating cearly who does what. This document (technically known as the Constitutional
Treaty) would have been rather similar to the constitution of a countrxy-even though
the EU is not, and does not aim to be, a single country. The text of the EU Constitution
was agreed in June 2004 and signed by all the Member State governments in October
2004 in Rome. It was due to come into force in 2006, but it failed to be ratified by all
the national parliaments and, in some countries, be approved by referendum. Vernon
Bogdanor, however, argues that it would make more sense to have a Europe-wide
referendum with a double and qualified majority of Member States and population
required in order to ratify any proposed Treaty amendment.
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abandoned EU Constitutional Treaty. The European Council
decided that the intergovernmental conference would conclude
before the end of 2007, so that the ToL could be ratified by all
28 EU member states before the European Parliament elections
in June 2009, which did not happen.
Unlike the abandoned EU Constitutional Treaty-which
would have replaced all previous Treaties with a single text-the
Treaty of Lisbon adds to but does not replace or consolidate the
TEU and EC Treaty, including the Acts of Accession. This means
that there is now another layer of Treaty law with the ToL. On
the positive side however, the ToL is a substantive legal
document, introducing significant legal, procedural, and
institutional changes. It draws heavily on the EU Constitutional
Treaty, confirms much of the substance of the EU Constitutional
Treaty, and includes, inter alia, provisions relating to the EU's
capacity to formulate a common foreign policy and to enjoy a
single legal personality0 for it to conclude international
agreements and to join international organizations. It is
somewhat paradoxical that, in the period since the collapse of
the Berlin Wall, at precisely the time in which there were few
credible alternatives to liberal democracy, there have been
growing doubts about the capacity of the structures and
institutions of liberal democracy to respond to contemporary
problems."1
The advent of the Lisbon Treaty did not affect EU
competences in any substantive way. In relation to the EU's
external relations, including those linked to its external energy
policy, the impact of the Lisbon Treaty has been to streamline
and rationalize existing processes and competences that are
linked to the various EU institutional actors.81 Most ostensibly,
79. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 8, art. 47, 2010 0.J. C 83/13, at 41. See also
Rafael Leal-Ai cas, EULegal Personality in Foreign Polic ?, 24 B. U. INTL L.J. 165 (2006).
80. Finn Laursen, The Post-Nice Agenda: Towards a New 'Constitutional' Treaty?, in
THE TREATY OF NICE: ACTOR PREFERENCES, BARGAINING AND INSTITUTIONAIL CHOICE
543 (Finn Laursen. cd.. 2006).
81. In some cases, the Lisbon Treaty has enhanced the role of existing ofice
holders-c.g., of what had previously been the High Representative of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy (now the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy)-to be involved in more EU processes with the aim of promoting
cohesion across the EU external policy spectrum. This office has not been granted
cotelfLcnces to Lake decisions on behalf of the 28 member states. Rather, its
competences focus on executing EU decisions and representing EU common positions
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the Lisbon Treaty streamlines processes related to the EU's
common foreign and security policy.82 It has amended the role
of the High Representative of the EU of the Common Foreign
and Security Policy to now become the High Representative of
the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy83 (High
Representative). The High Representative is supported in their
work by the EU's External Action Service.
How decisions at the EU level might be taken on the basis
of the TEU has remained unaffected by the Lisbon Treaty.
Article 16§3 TEU stipulates that the Council may adopt
measures on the basis of the qualified majority decision-making
procedure. However, as is the case with Article 192§2(c) TFEU,84
this is without prejudice to specific provisions in EU treaties,
which stipulate that Council decisions be based on the
unanimity decision-making procedure.
The Lisbon Treaty amended the Treaty on European
Union (TEU)85 and the Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community" ("EEC Treaty"), the latter consequently
becoming the TFEU. Title V, Chapter I (Article 21) of the TEU
stipulates in very clear terms how the EU's external action might
be conducted. From a public law point of view, Article 21 TEU
heavily constrains how EU external relations may be conducted.
The language is enlightened in that it makes EU external action
subject to such guiding principles as: "democracy, the rule of
that have already been reached by the Council and other bodies of the EU. For lurther
details, see Rafael Leal-Arcas, The European -Un's New Common Commercial Policy after
the Treaty of Lisbon, in THE TREATY OF LISBON AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN LAW AND
PouicY 262 (Martin Trybus & Luca Rubini eds., 2012).
82. Amongst other things, the Lisbon Treaty has created the office of the
President of the European Council who is a high lcycl official of the EU. carrying out
essentially an administrative role in relation to the work of the European Council and
also representing the EU on the world stage alongside other EU officials (namcly the
High Representative and the President of the EU Commission).
83. See generally TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 8, arts. 17-24, 2010 0.J. C 83, at 25-
31 (discussing the High Representative's role and powers).
84. See TFEU, supra note 4, art. 1 9 2(2)(c), 2010 0.J. C 83, at 133 (Exec. art. 175)
(stipulating that measures that, if adopted, would significantly affect member states'
choice between different energy sources and the general structure of thcir energy
supply, ought to be taken on the basis of the unanimity decision-making procedure).
85. Also known as the Maastricht Treaty, 1992 O.J. C 191/ 1, signed on 7 February
1992 and in force since 1 November 1993.
86. Also known as thre Treaty of Rome, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, signed on 25 March 1957
and in force since I january 1958.
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law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the
principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the
principles of the United Nations Charter and international law".
B. Energy and the Treaty ofLisbon
An innovation of the Lisbon Treaty is the introduction of
Title XXI TFEU on energy. This is effectively one provision-
namely Article 194 TFEU-that sets out the proclaimed
objectives of EU energy policy and their principal procedural
aspects."7  Notably, under Title XXI, EU energy policy is
unequivocally linked to the EU's environmental objectives.
Namely, Article 194 TFEU expressly refers to the need for EU
energy policy to preserve and improve the environment and to
promote energy efficiency and the development of renewable
sources. However, Article 194§2 states that EU measures "shall
not affect a Member State's right to determine the conditions
for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different
energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply,
without prejudice to Aiticle 192(2) (c) "."
In that respect, the impact of the Lisbon Treaty-whilst
significant in that it has streamlined and clarified EU
processes-most importantly, has been to craftily preserve
member states' prerogatives over sensitive policy areas such as
87. Ar ticle 194 reads: "1. In the context of the establishment and functioning of the
nternal marke and with regard for the need to preserve and improe the envionment, Uion
policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, to: (a) ensure
the functioning of the energy market; (b) ensure security of energy supply in the hion; (c)
Promote energy effcien c ant energy S'a ing and the development of new and renewable foras of
energy; and (d) promote the interconnction oJ energy networks. 2. Without prejudice to the
application of other provisions of the Treatics, the European Parliament and the
Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure [Author's note:
NB., i.e., on the qualified majority decision-making procedure], shall establish the
measures necessary to achieve the objectives in paragraph 1. Such measures shall be
adopted after consultation of the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee
of the Regions. Such neasures shall not ajfect a mber State's right to dete me the
conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energ sources and the
general structure oJ its energy supply, without prejudice to Aie 192(2)(c). 3. By wy of
derogation from paragraph 2, the Council, acting in accordance with a special
legislative procedure, shall unanimously and after consulting the European Parliament,
establish the measures referred to therein when they are primarily of a fiscal nature."
TFEU, supra note 4, art. 194, 2010 0.). C 83, at 134-35 (emphasis added).
88. Id.
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energy security. Article 194 TFEU also refers to one of the
prescribed aims of EU energy policy as being to ensure security
of energy supplies in the EU." Naturally, an objective such as
that could be effectively pursued with the appropriate legislative
support, which in this case seems to be lacking. Whilst Article
194 proclaims EU energy security as an EU objective for the first
time, it does not supplement the supranational EU bodies with
further competences to facilitate the pursuit of a common EU
energy security policy. Again, this is not surprising given how
sensitive this policy area is, and given the challenges of
garnering the requisite political will amongst member states to
endow the EU with powers to act to their exclusion in energy
security matters. However, Article 352 TFEU makes it possible
for the Council to make decisions necessary to attain treaty
objectives even when the treaties grant no express powers.
However, action pursuant to Article 352 TFEU can only be
based on unanimity in the Council.
Article 21§2 TEU provides another example of the impact
of the Treaty of Lisbon on ELU external relations, including
those that engage energy resources. It states that the EU shall
define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work
for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international
relations, in order to, amongst other things, help develop
international measures to preserve and improve the quality of
the environment and the sustainable management of global
natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development
(at Article 21§2(f)).9o This is relevant to the EU's external
89. SeeTFEU, supra note 4, art. 194 1 (b).
90. Literature on the link between governance and sustainable development is
abundant. See, e.g. Matt Andrews, Good Gover nmet teans Digferent Things in Dif/erent
Counties. 23 GOVERNANCF 7 (2010); Arthur A. Goldsmith, Is Governance Rejrm a
Catalyst for Development, 2 GOVLRNANCL 165 (2007): Merie S. Grindle, Good Enough
Governae: Poverty Reduction and Rejorn in Developing Countries, 17 GOVERNANC, 525
(2004); Kemrpe Ronald Hope, Jr., Toward Good Governance and Sustainable Development:
The African Peer Review Mlechanism, 18 GOVLRNANCE 283 (2005);"Daniel Kaufmann et
al, Gov rnance Miaters: From Measurenent to Action, 37 FIN. AND DEV. 10(2000); Kees van
Kcrshergen &Frans van Waaiden, 'Governance' as a Bridge between Disciplines: Cross-
Disciplinary Inspiration Regarding Shifts in Governance and Problems of Governability,
Accouttabiity and Legitimacy, 43 EUR. j. OF POL. RES. 143 (2004); Nalin Kishor & Arati
Belic, Does Anproved Governance Contribute to Sustainable Forest Mlanagement?, 19 J.OF
sUSTAINABLL FORESTRY 33 (2004); Francisco L. Rivera-Batiz, Democracy, Governance, and
Economic Growth: Thoy and Evidence, 6 REV. OF DFV. ECON.225 (2002); joseph E.
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relations that engage, amongst other things, energy resources.
Vhat we may conclude from the above is that, constitutionally,
EU external action, including in relation to its energy policy, is
heavily constrained by Article 21 and the enlightened principles
enshrined therein.
However, under Article 4 1 (i) TFEU, 'energy', in its wide
sense, is expressly referred to as a matter of shared competence.
Let us be reminded that shared competence matters may be
handled by the EU in accordance to the 'subsidiarity' and
proportionality principles,9" that is to say, should action be
considered more effective at the supranational level, EU action
may justifiably take precedence over member states.
Certain energy-related matters, though, are deemed
exclusive to the EU under Article 3 TFEU. For instance, the
competitive conditions of energy trade within the internal
market, or the question of tariffs when third country energy
commodities cross an EU border (in other words a common
commercial policy when commodities enter the customs union)
appear to fall squarely within the exclusive competence of the
EU.2
It is worth noting that for matters that do not fall within the
EU competence remit, it is still possible for the EU to act in that
the Council may make decisions in order to attain the objectives
of the EU as set out in EU treaties."
Stiglitz, Pariipation and Development: Perspectives ton the Comprehensive Development
Paradign, 6 REV. OF DLV. ECON.163 (2002).
91. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 8, art. 5(3), O.]. C 83, at 18.
92. See Rafael Leal-Aicas, Is Lisbon the Answer or the Anathema to EC Trade Law and
Poli ?, 2 INTL J. OF LIABILITY &Sc . ENQUIRY 125 (2009) (discussing the trade policy
front).
93. Article 352(1) of the TFEU reads: "If action by the Union should prove
necessary, within the framework of the policies defined in the Treaties. to attain one of
the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the
Council, acting unanimlously on a proposal friom the Commission and after obtaining
the consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate neasures. Where
the measures in question are adopted by the Council in accordance wvith a special
legislative procedure, it shall also act unanimously on a proposal from the Commission
and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament." TFEU, supra note 4, art.
352(1), 2010 0.). C 83, at 196 (ernphasis added).
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C. Challenges Towards Achieving a Common EU Energy Security
Policy
As we shall examine in Section V, the geostrategic context
and the disparate energy security capabilities of each member
state appear to explain why it might be unrealistic to have a
common EU energy security as a matter of exclusive EU
competence. Furthermore, achieving a common position on
matters of EU external action has never been easy.>4 That said,
there is scope for the EU to enhance its members' energy
security in a number of smaller yet significant ways. For instance,
by streamlining and rationalizing EU processes, and thus
removing any inconsistencies or contradictions in EU action, the
EU becomes a better, more efficient, actor. Also, Article 122
TFEU refers to the possibility of cross-EU solidarity in cases
where a member state is facing severe difficulties in, amongst
other things, the energy supply.
Article 21 TEU places major obstacles towards achieving EU
energy security that are not encountered by other sizeable
energy consumers such as China, India, Japan, and the United
States, who are free to pursue an energy security policy they find
most expedient.95 Again, this illustrates the challenges faced by
groups of states that are not fully federalized across the policy
spectrum. However, Article 21 TEU places no constraints on
how EU member states might in their own right, pursue their
respective energy security needs for which they could
conceivably pursue such realpolitik as any other state.
Article 22 TEU makes it clear that the European
Council96-in its capacity as the highest agenda-setting EU
94. See RAFAEL LEA-ARCAS, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EC EXTERNAL TRADE LAW
AND POLICY 85 (2008).
95. Note that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) refused EU overLures for
energy cooperation on account that the latter wanted energy relations with GCC on a
pro-inarket regulatory basis whereas the G(CC waned relatiois on the basis of strategic
partnerships. The GCC saw with suspicion EU calls for G(CC market liberalization as
potentially disruptive of the social order in those States. See KORKMAz, supra note 9, at
25.
96. An EU insLitfluionl comprised of the heads of government or state of the 28 EU
member states.
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institution9-may identify the EU's strategic interests on the
basis of the principles of Article 21 TEU and on the basis of
unanimity (as per Aiticle 22§1 TEU). Again, Articles 21 and 22
TEU make clear that there is no legally endorsed scope for
realpolitik within the EU.
However, it is worth noting that the EU extensively engages
with third-party states-namely those of MENA, Russia, Central
Asia, and the Caspian states-some of whose respect for the
humanist principles under Article 21 TEU is, at best, doubtful.
In such cases, we should be asking: to which extent does EU
external energy policy necessitated by the EU's economic
imperatives contradict the dictates of Articles 21 and 22 TEU,
and how are any such contradictions resolved?
Energy is multidimensional in that it cuts across several
fields of policy, including foreign policy, international trade,
human rights, security issues, and economics among others.
This complicates matters, given that EU competences are
uneven, depending on what is at issue. When we discuss energy
within the context of the EU and its external relations with
third-party states, a multiplicity of EU offices and institutions
may be at play, namely, the EU Commissioner for Energy; the
European Council's President; the High Representative-who is
also a vice-president of the Commission-assisted by the EU
External Action Service; and the Foreign Affairs Council-which
is a sub-committee of the Council. Numerous provisions across
the TEU and TFEU spell out their powers and duties.
For instance, the European Council's President's role is,
inter alia, to ensure the external representation of the EU's
common foreign and security policy without prejudice to the
High Representative's mandate of representing the EU abroad
in foreign and security policy9" The High Representative's role
is more comprehensive in order to promote cohesion of EU
external action.99 To that end, the High Representative has
97. As opposed to an ad hoc sunmit of heads of state/government who are
otherwise only bound by general international law and their own respective
constitutions in how they behave.
98. SeeTEU post-Lisbon, supra note 8, art. 15(6), 2010 0.J. C 83, at 23.
99. See id. arts. 21, 22, 24, 26 (discussing the Union's role in ensuring
consistency); see also TFEU, supra note 4, art. 329. 2010 0.J. C 83, at 190 (providing the
High Representative with thc ability to make pronounceents on consistency of EU
action).
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access to relevant Council sessions and to those of the
Commission. The role of the EU's Foreign Affairs Council-a
subcommittee of the Council-is to develop EU external action
in line with strategic guidance provided beforehand by the
European Council. 00 In that respect we witness how external
relations, given their sensitive nature, are deferred to the EU
institutions in which member states participate in their own
right and are thus able to fully defend their interests, rather
than to supranational institutions such as the EU Commission.
Article 15§4 TEU emphasizes that a consensus decision-making
process applies, unless there is express provision in the treaties
for decisions to be taken differently. Also, Article 31(1-3) TEU
makes clear that proposals by the High Representative in
relation to the common foreign and security policy put to the
European Council and the Council are subject to the unanimity
decision-making procedure in those intergovernmental fora.'0
However, as the European Council is an EU body-albeit an
inter-governmental rather than supranational one-all action
flowing from it must be in compliance with the guiding
principles of the EU mentioned above.102 Therefore, whilst
warmer or fully institutionalized relations with authoritarian
energy-rich third-party states are clearly matters of strategic
interest for the EU, their potential conflict with Article 21 TEU
could potentially present complications for cohesive action.
Furthermore, Article 22(1) TEU promotes consistency and
conditions the decision-making capacity of the European
Council by stating that European Council decisions on the EU's
strategic interests and objectives must be in accordance with its
common foreign and security policy and with other areas of EU
external action. 0 In that respect, the European Council-in its
100. The European Council is charged with identifying the EU's strategic
interests, along with determining the objectives of and defining the general guidelines
for the common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defense
implications. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 8. art. 26, 2010 0.J. C 83, at 31.
101. See id. art. 31(2), at 33-34 (requiring unanimity with regard to the Union's
strategic interests and objectives. as referred to in art. 22(1)).
102. See id. art. 21(1), at 28.
103. See id. art. 22(1), at 29 ("EC Decisions on the strategic interests and
ojectives of the Union shall relate to the CFSP and to other areas of the external
action of tihe Union. Such decisions may concern the relations of the Union with a
specific country or region or may be thematic in approach.").
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capacity as an EU institution-does not have free reign to
promulgate policy in a manner that is inconsistent with the
entire EU project. Thus, as the treaties stand, even the most
supreme political body of the EU-the European Council' 4-
cannot sanction EU energy policy that contradicts Article 21
TEU. Of course, this obstacle could be overcome were member
states to take the necessary legislative steps to remove the Article
21 TEU constraints, such as concluding a subsequent treaty that
amends or supersedes its effect, or, more controversially, were
they to condone Article 21 TEU non-compliant EU action by not
opposing or challenging it in the relevant EU fora. Naturally,
these are politically difficult options that are unlikely to be
supported by member states other than those willing to accept
the trade-offs between enlightened ideals and economic
exigencies. Conceivably, member states with strong liberal
traditions and a politically active civil society might be less likely
to support such significant ontological changes to the EU.
Again, law follows political changes, and shifts in the political
direction are good portends of the legislative changes that may
potentially follow.
Whilst the EU lacks the powers of a sovereign actor i
relation to diplomatically pursuing its energy security, it does
possess a comprehensive energy policy that is multifaceted and
that makes the most of the powers that lie within its remit of
competences. Moreover, whilst its energy policy focuses mainly
on the IEM, it strategically contains outward aspects that focus
on promoting the EU's energy interests regionally and globally.
Again, this happens to the extent that the EU may act in unison
in such matters. Whilst it cannot sui jurs assume EU member
states' competences over the entire diplomatic policy spectrum,
104. Throughout the EU treatics we witness a logical deference towards the
European Council. Under Article 15 TEU, the European Council is charged wvith:
"'provid[ing] the inpetus and general political direction and prioritics". Id. art. 15, at
23. It also makes clear at 15§1 that the European Council does not exercise lkgislative
functions. Strictly speaking therefore, any subsequent treaties contracted between the
28 heads of State/goverinment are done so outside the context of the EU institution of
the European Council. In that respect, although it is the same configuration of
individual national office holders, they do not function within the public law aspects of
EU, rather, in their capacity to conclude international conventions, they function
within the context of the area of public international law relating to the law of treatics
and to the extent permitted by their respective national laws.
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it is not prohibited from taking action globally that, as a
consequence, enhances the EU's energy security. As we shall see,
this may take the form of the EU promoting greater energy-
market liberalization in the belief that more fluid energy
markets would benefit energy consumers such as itself that are
reliant on regional and international markets for their energy
needs. It may also take the form of promoting regional
integration in that the EU has set up and promoted the Energy
Community (EnC) that involves several neighboring states with
a view to integrating their energy markets to the IEM.s0 These
actions, while soft approaches, may potentially have a cumulative
effect towards achieving energy security.
IV. DIVERSITY OFEU ENERGY POLICY
As we have briefly discussed above, EU energy policy is a
composite affair that reflects the complexities of energy in its
wide sense. To be more precise, EU energy policy is essentially a
bundle of policies that target or engage various aspects of
energy, both internal and external. For instance, several EU
policies aim at the progressive integration chiefly of the gas and
electricity energy landscapes of member states and the
consequent formation of the IEM. There is a raft of EU
legislation to this end.'@ In that respect, such policies are
internally focused. However, many of these policies also contain
externally focused aspects. For instance, policies linked to the
IEM also seek to draw third-party states into the IEM through
the creation and development of the Energy Community. In
that respect, the IEM itself contains internal and external
aspects that are inherent to it.
105. About Us, ENERGY CONTY. (May 24, 2013), http://www.cncrgy-
community.org/portal/page/portal/ ENC _HOME.
106. See Summaries of EU Legislation: Eegy, EU ROPA, http://europa.eu/
legislation-summniaries/cncrgy/index cn.htmi (last isited May 28, 2013) (sunmarizing
EU legislation in relation to energy). The purpose of the present paper is to highlight
the comrprehensive nature of EU cnergy policy rather than provide an account of its
finer aspects. In that respect, we do not intend to list and discuss all legislation. Section
III of this paper (on the legal aspects of EU energy policy) aims at providing an
overview of the constitutional aspects of energy policy within the EU by highlighting
the coinplkxities of eiergy in Lermns of how it iay engage separate spheres of
competences.
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Other instances of EU policy aim at promoting greater
liquidity of energy markets on the assumption that more
voluminous trade flows towards global markets are ultimately in
the interests of net energy consumers-such as the EU--who
depend on the outside world for their energy security, chiefly on
markets. 07 This aim (greater liquidity of energy markets), in
turn, is pursued through a variety of strategies (e.g., through the
promotion of the Energy Charter Treaty and of pro-market
practices abroad).
A. Types of EUEnergv Policy
It might be helpful, therefore, to regard EU energy policy
as actually being a wide range of policies that could broadly be
aggregated into the following two categories:
- policies that relate to energy markets and energy use
within the EU; and
- policies that promote EU energy security interests with
third-party states and in international organizations.
Policies that seek to draw third-party neighboring states into
the IEM-eg., through the EnC-although concerned with the
IEM, clearly sit in the second category in that their ultimate aim
is the promotion of EU energy interests abroad. Policies that set
targets for more efficient and sustainable use of energy within
the EU fall within the first category, whilst policies that seek to
promote efficient use of energy abroad sit in the second
category, as, arguably, it is ultimately in the EU's energy security
interests to promote energy efficiency abroad. There may also
be policies that relate to energy markets and energy use in the
EU which make it necessary for the EU to engage with the
outside world; such policies also fall within the second category,
given that they are ultimately connected with furthering EU
energy interests. What is also becoming increasingly clear is that
there is little point to a fully integrated IEM and Trans-
European Network for energy (TEN-EN) when there are
insufficient energy supplies flowing into it.
107. Naturally, this does not preclude the EU froin seeking closer, strategic,
relations With energy producers in the MENA and Caspian regions and With Russia.
This illustrates the diversiied approach to energy security that the EU pursues.
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In that sense, a fully integrated IEM and TEN-EN risks
becoming somewhat redundant when there are insufficient
inward energy flows.108 In that sense, a fully integrated and
functional yet energy-starved TEN-EN might end up a tragic
reminder-such as ghost towns or decommissioned rail-tracks-
of what might have been. A weak long-term EU external energy
strategy that is not integrated and unified could lead to EU
failure to address its security needs. Again, as we mention
throughout this paper, the EUj is 52% energy dependent on the
outside world. If too much effort and resource on the part of the
EU is being diverted into the development of the IEM and TEN-
EN without there being proportionately effective EU action to
address the external aspects of EU security, the EU may have
squandered precious resources that could have been usefully
diverted into making the EU less hydrocarbon dependent by,
amongst other things, greater promotion and subsidization of
low-carbon and renewable energy research and development.
However, again, as we have analyzed above, the treaties upon
which the EU rests, in their current form, present structural
constraints that restrict the deployment of a more effective
comprehensive EU external energy policy.109
As discussed above, the integration of the IEM is considered
an important element of EU energy policy in that a more
108. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Conimittec and the Conimittee of the
Regions, On security of energy supply and international cooperation-The EU Energy
Policy: Engaging with Partners beyond Our Borders", COM (2011) 539 Final, at 4(Sept.
2011) [hereinafter On Security of Energy Supply]. The Commission stated that: " The
EU energy market depends on high levels of imports to function, and therefore depends on free
and transparent makets. In their absence, the EU is vulnerable to political and price volatility.
Supply security in one part depends on security across the market as a whole. External
energy policy needs to reflect the interconnectedness of the internal market and the
interdependence of the EU Member Statcs."Id. (emphasis added).
109. See id. at 2. In this document. the Commission cites the EU's heavy energy
dependency on imports (c. 60% gas and c. 80% oil) and the growing competition it
faces in connection to rising future energy demand. All these matters necessitate a
comprehensive external cncrgy policy. The Commission emphasizes how an EU
external energy policy is crucial to the completion of the IEM. It also cautions about
how the impact of energy bilaterals between EU member states and third-party states
may potentially have a fragmenting effect on the IEM. Aware that increase in global
energy demand will not be coming from the old world, the Commission recommends
that the EU actively support developing economics to access sustainable energy and
adopt more sustainable processes to ensure that global enertgy use becomes more
prudent.
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efficient internal system enhances energy security. To that end,
there is regulatory convergence that is taking place across the
EU. Currently, the regulatory situation across the EU is not fully
harmonized.'o The IEM has also been promoted through the
Energy Community (EnC) in order to also achieve regulatory
convergence with a view to integrating the electricity and gas
markets of neighboring states with the IEM.
The EnC was set up further to the Energy Community
Treaty between the EU and several third-party states. It currently
involves 10 parties-the EU, Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina,
Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, and
Ukraine.111 It has been promoted by the EU to engage its
neighbors on the basis that energy market and network
integration is in the EU's energy security interests. 112
The EnC could be seen as a uni-sectoral 'integration
without membership"' arrangement. The effect of the EnC is
that parties are legally obligated to apply the EU energy acquis 14
with the aim of creating a legal and economic framework in
relation to the EU's Network Energy'15 in order to: "create a stable
regulatory and market framework capable of attracting
investment in gas networks, power generation, and transmission
and distributions networks, create a single regulatory space for
trade . . . , enhance the security of supply of the single
regulatory space, improve the environmental situation, . . . and
energy efficiency, foster the use of renewables and set out the
110. Nikolay Mizulin, EC Experience in Creating (n InternalEnegy Warket: Leson sJor
the WTO, in GLOBAL CHALLENGES AT THE INTERSECTION OF TRAt)F, ENERGY AND THF
ENVIRONMLNT 67, 67-71 (Joost Pauwelyn, ed., 2010).
11. Pates, ENEREN CMTY. (May 24, 2013), http://wNy.energy-cormmunity.org/
portal/page/portal/EN(-HOME/ENERGY_(OMMUNITY/ Stakeholders/Parties.
112. Note that the Commission states that the EnC should be promoted with
third-party States wvho are negotiating or concluding an FTA with the EU. See On
Security of Energy Supply, supra note 108, at 7.
113. See Roman Petrov, Energy Community as a Promoter of the European Unions
Enegy Acquis to Its Neighbourhood, 38 LfA ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 331, 331
(2012).
114. However, it does allow for staggered implementation. For instance, Moldova
is doing so in four successive waves, wvhilst Ukraine is doing so in five.
115. See The Energy Community Treaty art. 2(2), 2006 O.J. L 198/18, at 19
("Nctwork Energy shall include the electricity and gas sectors falling within tie scope
of the European Community Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC".).
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energy trade conditions in the single regulatory space, and
develop market competition and exploit economies of scale.""lb
The key features of the EnC could be understood as
regulatory convergence towards achieving a common regulatory
and more predictable investment space as means towards more
integrated energy markets.11 Georgia, Turkey, Armenia, and
Norway have observer status.118
Many EU member states engage in other fora to promote
their energy interests. For instance through, amongst others, the
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), the EnC, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO)11 ' and the Organization for
116. Id. art. 2, at 19.
117. The EnC is governed by a Ministerial Council which is the supreme political
forum within its structures. There is a dispute settlement body that legal persons
affected by some EnC measure may petition.
118. This is possible under Artidce 96 of the Energy Community Treaty, though all
EnC members must consent to this through the Ministerial Council which governs the
En(. Id. art. 96, at 28. It is also possible for EU member states to participate in this
organization as 'participants' rather than members (as is the EU) as per Articles 1§2
and 95 of the Energy Community Treaty. Presently, Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece,
and the UK, conceivably due to their bordering and energy-transit significant
geographic positioning, participate in EnCc meetings with this status.
119. NATO is not concerned with energy security per se. It is concerned with the
collective defense interests of its members. That said, there have been suggestions that
it could expand its remit to address the defense of its members' key energy
infrastructures and the security of their energy supply chain against 'terrorist' acts. In
that sense, its work could potentially enhance its ncnbers energy security from
potential shocks linked to hostilities. How exactly this could take form in relation to
installations that are outside the territories of NATO members in a manner consistent
with international law and the principle of non-int ervention is far from clear. See
Florian Baumann, Europe's Way to Ener g Security: The Outer Dimensions of Enery Security:
From Power Politics to Energy Governance, 15 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 77, 84 (2010);
SENATE MINORITY STAFF REPORT, 1 12TH CONG., ENERGY AND SECURITY FROM THE
(ASPIAN To EUROPL 55, S. PRT. 112-42 (Comm. Print 2012), available at
http://wwv.foreign.senate.gov/publications/download/energy-and-securit7-from-the-
caspian-to-curope. The Senate Connittec Print contains a series of recommendations
for the US Government to implement to ensure the energy security of NATO members
and their progressive energy independence from Russia. The Committee goes on to
call for NATO involvement, given that the decades to come are likely to involve armed
conflict over scarcity of en1ergy resources and related disputes. See also Robert Bcjcsky,
Geopolitics, Oil Law Reforn, and Connodity Aarket Expectations, 63 Okla. L. Rev. 193, 276-
77 (2011) (analyzing the geopolitics at play around national security anxieties that in
the post-Cold War world have mutated into anxicties around energy security). We are
inclined to agree with Bejesky's conclusions: 'If consumption reduces due to
technological progress, then demand and global market prices drop ceteris paribus. So,
too, should thc" national security' anxiety, articulated by some as manifesting into a
post-Cold War pentagon mission to "protect" global oil supply, dissipate. The argument
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Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD)
International Energy Agency (IEA)1 20. Consequently, the
benefits of multilateralism might also accrue at the EU collective
level.
B. Factors Affecting EU Eneygy Policy
In listing a few aspects of EU energy policy, we want to
illustrate how multifaceted EU energy policy is:
- it focuses on integrating the domestic gas and electricity
markets of EU member states into the IEM;
- it promotes the IEM's integration with the energy
markets and networks of neighboring third-party states;
- it sets minimum targets in relation to energy efficiency,
GHG emissions reduction, and energy source
diversification for member states to implement; and
- it outlines the general features of the EU's approach to
external energy relations.
In relation to the last, the EU's external energy policy is
itself a highly composite affair given that there are several policy
objectives to be promoted. Amongst others, such objectives are:
- the promotion of emissions reduction abroad to ensure
that the EU's industries operate competitively against
foreign industries;
- a more efficient use of energy abroad to ensure that
energy consumers such as the EU benefit from lasting
supplies; and
- further liberalization and integration of energy markets
abroad to ensure that more energy flows reach global
markets on which large consumers such as the EU rely,
that global military hcgcnony breeds stability-including for iarkets-out of what would
otherwise be chaos, lacks substantial foundation. "Id.
120. Note that the IEA obligates its members to hold oil reserves Worth 90 days of
their oil consunIption under its Coordinated Emergency Response Mechanism. See
Energy Security, INT'L ENFRGY AGENCT, http://www.iea.org/topics/energyseciirity/
(last visited May 28, 2013). The EU however also has similar energy reserve
requirements to those of the IEA. See Council Directive 98/93/EC, art. 1, 1998 O.J. L
358/100 (mandating EU member states to hold ninety days' worth of their average
consumption of petroleun products). In effect, this Iirective inducts the IE A
requirement into EU law by mandating that all EU imcinber statcs-nOL just IEA
members-hold ninety days' worth of internal consumption of petroleum products.
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in order to meet a considerable part of their energy
needs.
Successive EU Commission communications highlight the
purported desire to achieve cohesion and consistency across the
EU policy spectrum. We have also seen how the post of High
Representative has been amended to, amongst other things,
ensure cohesion and consistency in the EU's external action.
This leads us to conclude that EU energy policy may not only be
conditioned by the multiplicity of energy-related EU policy
objectives but may further be conditioned by EU objectives in
policy fields other than energy. This means that the
development of EU energy policy is contingent upon seemingly
extraneous objectives, such as those concerned with
environmental protection and economic growth. We witness this
in energy policies aimed at containing C02 emissions, e.g., the
EU's policy that sets targets for 20% of its overall energy
consumption to come from renewable energy. Let us take
Directive 2009/28/EC121 (briefly mentioned earlier) as an
example: it is concerned with the promotion of renewables.
According to Aiticle 1 (subject matter and scope), the directive
establishes:
[A] common framework for the promotion of energy
from renewable energy sources. It sets mandatory national
targets for the overall share of energy from renewable
energy sources in gross final energy consumption and for
the share of renewable energy for transport. It lays down
rules relating to statistical transfers between member states,
joint projects between member states and third countries,
guarantees of origin, administrative procedures,
information and training, and access to the electricity grid
for energy from RES. It also establishes sustainabilitv criteria
for biofuels and bio-liquids.m'
It is clear that this legislative instrument promotes policies
that impact a number of other EU policy fields and fields of
action, including the internal market, investment, external
121. Energy from Renewable Sources Directive, supra note 19. Both repealed
instruments established definitions for different types of energy from renewable energy
sources.
I22. Id.
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relations, energy, environmental protection, and trade. Clearly,
policy fields do not exist in isolation from one another. What is
more, in this sense, 'external relations' is no stand-alone field of
action; rather, it is one that could potentially engage any policy
field of the EU in so far it has an ultra-EU dimension.13 For
instance, to promote joint-projects between member states and
third-party states that take place outside the EU, the EU must
engage in the promotion of investment protection outside the
EU.
In another example, the EU Commission's 'Energy
Roadmap 20501 2, the Commission-an EU institution with
executive powers tasked with defending the entire EU project
and the general EU interest in line with the treaties125-
proposes a comprehensive strategy for the EU's energy needs. In
this policy document, the EU's energy security and
environmental protection objectives are inextricably linked. The
proposals focus on promoting renewables, energy efficiency,
and the decarbonization of the EU economy at the EU, national,
and regional levels.126
123. The EU already has a series of complementary and targeted frameworks
ranging from specific energy provisions in bilateral agreements with third countries
(Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (P(As),
Association Agreements (AAs) ct cetera) and Memoranda of Understanding on energy
cooperation, to multilateral treaties such as the Energy Community Treaty (which sets
up the EnC), and participation in the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). It is currently
negotiating new agreements with several countries including important energy
provisions. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the
Regions, Energy 2020: A Strategy For Competitive, Sustainable and Secure Energy,
COM (2010) 639 Final, at 19 (Oct. 2010); see also Treaties Office Database, EUR. UNION
EXTERNAL ACTION, http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/searchBy7Activity7.do?
parent=851 2&xinname=751 &actName=Energ y&printAcrivity (listing cene gyrelated
treaties concluded between the EU and third-party states).
124. Energy Roadnap 2050, supra note 14.
125. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 8, art. 17. 2010 OJ. C 83, at 25. Also note that
under Article 17§2, the EU Commission has the exclusive right, save for where the
treatics provide for otherwise, to propose EU legislation for adoption. Id. In relation to
EU enertgy policy, the Commission has been heralded as a progressive force ready to
take on strong German and French interests in pushing for the unbundling of the
enertgy markets of Germany and France and of the EU in order to allow more market
actors to participate in the belief that this leads to better conditions of competition,
that, in turn, would benefit EU consumers. See KORKMAz, supra note 9, at 19.
126. Key features of the Roadnap are the diversification of the primary energy
mix through supportive policies so that 55-75'% energ consumption comes from
renewable sources, with about 97% of electricity from renewables. These are very
1266 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURVAL [Vol. 36:1225
Also, the Commission acknowledges that the more
interdependent and globalized the energy market becomes, the
more the EU energy situation becomes vulnerable to global
trends such as supply shocks and price fluctuations. Whilst
therefore it may be in the EU's interests to pursue strategic
bilateral and regional relations with energy producers in order
to lock energy flows towards the EU, it is also in its interests to
promote energy market liberalization for all energy flows
outside its strategic relationships in the hope that more energy
on global markets will ultimately serve the interests of energy
importers such as the EU.1
The Commission sees in Russia an important partner,
despite EU objectives to move towards a low-carbon economy
and away from hydrocarbons. For instance, Russia and Ukraine
are important regional producers of biofuels that could assist
the EU in its move towards a low-carbon economy. What is
more, conventionally extracted natural gas'18 is less polluting
than coal and oil; so access to a secure supply of Russian gas,
through Ukraine1 29 or other routes, also contributes to the EU's
ambitious targets to be met within the next 38 years. It contains the goal of reducing
CO2 emissions by 80-95% of pre-1990 levels by 2050. Given that 35% of CO2 emissions
in the EU arise fr the production of energy, achieving this goal will put the energy
industries under considerable pressure. Energy Roadmap 2050, supra 14. at 2. 4-5. 7.
See also FU ENERGY INNOVATION POLICY TOWAR)S 2050 (lean-Michel Glachant, Nicole
Ahner & Leonardo Mecus eds., 2012).
127. Note for instance that roughly 50% of global oil supplies are made available
on global markets with no restrictions on wvho ends up being the purchaser. See
GiOBAlT ENERGY GOVERNANCE: THE NEW RUL ES OF THF GAME 4-5, (Andreas Goldthau
& Jan Martin Witte eds., 2010). Whilst the EU would want to preserve its strategic
relationships wvith energy suppliers, it would be in EU interests to promote energy
market liberalization for the rest of the world, hoping that more energy commodities
would reach the market for it-along with the other energy consumers-to meet needs
not met by preferential deals. See GIACOIO LUCIANT, SECURITY OF OTT1 SUPP ES: ISSUES
& RFMEDIES, (2013).
128. We draw a distinction between conventionally extracted gas and that through
fracking, given that shale gas extracted through fracking is environmentally harmiul.
See Environmental impacts of shale gas extration, BRITISH GEO. SURV.,
http://www.bgs.ac.uk/research/cncrgy/shalkGas/cnvironmentallipacts.htil (last
visited Apr. 8, 2013) (listing concerns including degradation of water bodies, methane
leakage, increasing seismic volatility, etc. in relation to shale gas extraction).
129. According to the EU webpage on EU-Ukraine relations: "The EU has
negotiated a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement ()(TA). The
negotiations were launched in 2008 and they have now been concluded. The DCFA
will be part of a future Association Agreement, which will replace the present
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Ukraine (which dates
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efforts to produce energy in a less polluting way than energy
derived from coal and oil.
The Energy Roadmap 2050 acknowledges the importance
of international cooperation in the pursuit of EU energy
interests abroad. For example, the EU must also ensure that it
pushes for greater environmental protection abroad for
economic reasons alongside environmental concerns: namely, to
ensure that EU-based industries do not become uncompetitive
in relation to goods and services produced by industries based in
other economies which are not under similar constraints.130
However, the fusion of environmental and energy security
objectives within the EU's energy policy in the Energy Roadmap
2050 has attracted criticism for harming the EU's energy
security by making it conditional, rather than unfettered by,
environmental obj ectives.' 3 1 Successive Commission
communications emphasize the need to shift the energy mix
composition to one that is more sustainable in terms of supply
but also in terms of less harmful environmental impacts.
Renewables provide the obvious solution, however, the
financial cost of developing such energy resources makes them
less economically competitive than hydrocarbons. This has
important implications for investments. The EU Commission
places great expectations on markets to provide the necessary
solutions, not least because the capital amounts necessary would
place great strain on member states' and the EU's budgets.13 2
from 1998). The initialing of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement took place in
Brussels in March 2012, except for the DCFT which was initialed on 19th July 2012.
Since the entire Agreement has now been initialed, the next step will be the signature
of the Agreement by the Council when the conditions are met." Ukraine, EUROPEAN
COMMissioN, http:// cc.curopa.cu /rade/creating-opportunitics/bilateral-relati ons/
countries/ukraine (last visited Apr. 8, 2013).
130. See Energy Roadmap 2050, supra note 14. at 16.
131. See Energy Roadmap Workshop, supra note 33. At the recent workshop
organized by the European Parliament's external policy committee to discuss the
implications of the Energy Roadnap 2050, various criticisns were raised on the
assumption that the EU's quest for eneirgy security that is sinultancously
environmentally friendly places the EU at a disadvantage when compared to other
energy consume rs-c.g., China and India-which pursuc a harder energy security.
132. The EU would have to invest £900 billion on new clectricity gencration alone
over the next 25 years or so. See An Energy Policy for Europe, supra note 12, at 9; see also
Commission of the European Conimniti Lies, Communication friom the Commission to
the European Council: A European Economic Recovery Plan, COM(2008) 800 Final. at
14 (Nov. 2008) [hereinafter Economic Recovery] (stating that the European
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What remains feasible at the EU and member state policy-
development levels is the use of various policy tools to
encourage investments in the renewable energy sector.
On the other hand, we should also point out that the EU is
not shifting towards a more sustainable or low-carbon energy mix
anytime soon, or at least, is doing so at a slower rate than what
circumstances demand. Scientists have overwhelmingly agreed
that natural and anthropogenic climate change is a reality, and
that it may be irreversible. In its Synthesis Report of 2007,' the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 134 stated
that: "Anthropogenic warming could lead to some impacts that
are abrupt or irreversible, depending upon the rate and
magnitude of the climate change."lb
At the global level, colossal capital investments are
necessary to upgrade and expand the extraction and
Investment Bank (ElB) wvill significantly increase its financing of climate change,
energy security and infrastructure investments by up to C6 bn per year).
133. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
SYNTHESTS RFPORT(2007), available at http: //vw.ipc.ch/ pdf/ assessnent-report/ ar4/
syr/ar4_syr.pdf [hereinafter CLIMATL CHANGE 2007]. This document consists of the
underlying report, adopted section by section at IPCC Plenary XXVII (Valencia, Spain,
12-17 November 2007) that represents thc formally agreed statement of the IPCC
concerning key findings and uncertainties contained in the Working Group
contributions to the Fourth Assessment Report. Also in the Fourth Assessment Report
th IP CC has referred to the "unequivocal heating of the planc". Id.
134. The Intirgoverinmental Panel on Cliniate Change is the international corpus
of scientists par excellence formed, ultimately, under the auspices of the United Nations.
According to its web Site: "The lIntergovernmcntal Panel on Climate Change (IP(() is
thc leading international body for the assessment of climate change. It was established .
. . to provide the wvorld with a clear scientif view on the current state of knowledge in
climate change and its potential environnertal and socio-econonic impacts.... The
IPCC is a scientific body .... It reviews and assesses thc most recent scientific, technical
and socio-economic information produced worldwide relevant to the understanding of
climate change. It does not conduct any research nor does it monitor climate related data or
parameters.... Currently 195 countries are members of the IP((. Governments participate
in the ew process and the plenary Sessions, where main decisions about the IPCC work
programme are taken and reports are accepted, adopted and approved. The IPCC
Bureau Members, including thc Chair, are also elected during the plenary Sessions.
Because of its scientifc and intergovernmental nature, the IPCC embodies a unique
opportunity to provide rigorous and balanced scientific information to decision
makers. By endorsing the IPCC reports, governments acknowledge the authority of
their scientific content. The work oj the organization is therefore policy-relevant and yet policy-
neutral, never polic- prescriptive." INT'L PANLL ON CLIMATL CHANGL, http:// ww.ipcc.ch/
organlization/lorganlization.shtiI (last visited Apr. 8, 2013) (emphasis added).
135. CLIMATE CHANGF 2007, supra note 133, at 53 (emphasis added).
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distribution infrastructure for hydrocarbons.136 Such upgrading
must also happen to EU-based or -linked infrastructure, and the
cost of that is likely to be high. However, investments do not
materialize when all costs alongside projected profits cannot be
recouped for a certain period of time. Investing such vast sums
towards hydrocarbon-related infrastructure seems to, if not pull
in the opposite direction of sustainability, have a disincentivizing
effect on efforts to shift economies towards more 'sustainable'
and low-carbon energy mixes any time soon.
V. GEOSTRATEGIC CONTEXT IA RELATION TO THE NEXUS
OFEUAND ENERGY SECURITY
As we have alluded to so far, the EU is quite unlike other
actors in the international arena in that it is neither a sovereign
state-entailing the legal consequences stemming from such a
status-nor is it merely an international organization. In that
respect, there are structural obstacles in the EU's path towards
energy security that are not met by sovereign states that are fully
federated, where the central/federal authority has fewer or no
obstacles in deploying a comprehensive external energy security
strategy. These obstacles have implications for an optimum EU
energy security. That is not to say that that EU efforts
undermine EU member states' efforts, nor do we mean to
suggest that the combined effect of the individual energy
security efforts of each EU member would have amounted to a
more enhanced collective EU energy security. Rather, that it is
more probable that each member state's individual energy
136. This is not to be dismissed lightly given that IEA projections call for
investments of at least USS6.3 trillion by 2030 for the oil sector alone to meet growing
global energy demand. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, INT'L ENERCY AGENCY,
WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2008 89 (2008). For the entire energy sector, the IEA calls
for investments of USD 33 trillion by 2035. In the lInternational Energy Agency's 2010
World Energy Outlook report, it is stated that: "Cumulative investment of [US]$33
trillion (year-2009 dollars) over 2010-2035 is needed in energy-supply infrastructure ...
SThis investment enables the replacement of reserves and production facilities that are
retired, as well as the expansion of production and transport capacity to meet demand
growth"). OFFICL OF THL CHIEF ECONOMIST, INT'L ENERGY A(ENCY, WORLD ENERGY
OUTLOOK 2010, at 93 (2010). Also note that the IEA projec that on a global level, for
each USD I not spent on such infrastructure before 2020 an additional USD 4.3 would
need to be spent after 2020 so as to compensate for the increased costs associated with
emissions. Eiergy Roadmap 2050, supra note 14, at 16 (citing the intLernatioal energy
agency's world energy outlook 2011 report).
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security may be better addressed were action to be orchestrated
by some central supranational authority.' 3 Even more so were
the EU to be a fully federalized entity with an unrestrained remit
for external action on all aspects-including diplomatic-of
energy.
In certain policy areas (including the customs union
between its 28 members), the EU is fully federalized, whereas in
others, no sui juris EU competence exists2 8 Energy itself is no
unitary policy matter; rather, it is a multi-dimensional composite
matter that cuts across numerous policy fields, some of which sit
chiefly with the EU-e.g., the IEM in electricity and gas-whilst
others are the sovereign preserve of member states-e.g., the
hard diplomatic aspects of energy.
137. Naturally, this is an assumption contingent on the doxa that integration leads
to economies of scale and that there are inherent benefits to such a phenomenon. See
Economic Recovery, supra note 132. at 4. The Commission states that: "Member States
should again take advantage of the strengths of the EU-effective coordination,
credible frameworks offered by the Stability and Growth Pact and the Lisbon Strategy,
as well as the benefits of scale offered by the curo and the largest single market in the
world. The interplay of national and EU action can help all Member States weather the
worst of the global economic storms and emerge stronger from the crisis."Id.
138. See KORKMAZ, supra note 9, at 8-11. Korkmaz provides an interesting
taxonomy of intcr-statc collective energy security arrangements based on international
relations theory. For instance inter-state energy relations could be based on energy
societies that arc: asocial-that is to say, ones in which State X forcefully occupics State
Y and exploits, amongst other things, its energy resources (hence the 'asocial' tag);
coexistent, in that sovereign actors are each after their own needs through peaceful
means: cooperative, by cooperation thirough bilateral and multilateral means; converging,
in that parties seek to harmonize aspects of their energy landscapes; confederative, in
that parties pool some sovereignty together on specific internal and external aspects of
energy to address sone-not all-aspccts of their collective enerlgy needs; or, lastly,
federative, where therc is total integration whereby each party becomes a province of the
federal system and all competence in relation to energy is pooled at the federal level.
Korknaz concludes that there is no transfer of competence from EU member states to
the EU over external energy matters. Member states preserve this aspect of their
sovereignty. What is more, the lack of absolute convergence between their internal
energy markets means that the EU is disqualified from being considered a convergence
energy secuity society. (Note that the IEM is restricted to predominantly the regulatory
aspects of the internal gas and electricity EU member state markets). In that respect, it
remains a cooperative one. Notably, Korkmaz states that the EU: "lacks the ability to
guaranteC companies tihe right to sell cIcctricity and gas in member states on equal
terms wvith national companies." Id. at 28.
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A. Nexus oJEU Energy Policy and Foreign Policy
In the case of the nexus between energy and foreign policy,
what we witness is the watershed between hard sovereignty
matters and other, softer, matters that are more amenable to
being assigned to the EU. It would be misleading to regard
energy as a strict economic matter that may be assigned to some
supranational body when, actually, a sovereign actor-in this
case, any EU member state-may consider itself better placed
than some supranational body to pursue its energy needs. To
make this clearer, let us imagine that Germany's energy
relations with Russia are more privileged than, say, Latvian
relations with Russia. German energy interests might therefore
be better served in that its energy industry and national
economy benefits from the consequent energy trade to a greater
extent than that of another member state. Conceivably,
preserving that specific energy reality within the EU would be in
Germany's national interests.' Let us look at a more concrete
example: the Aord Stream is a pipeline installation that goes
under the North Sea and, therefore, bypasses the most
geographically straightforward route-that is to say, the
territories of EU member states whose relations with Russia are
somewhat strained (namely, the Baltic states and Poland).140
Other EU states-namely, Hungary and Italy-may want to
139. Note the German Chancellor. Angela Merkel's call, at a 2007 European
Parliament session, for more 'institutionalized energy relations' with Russia in order to
discipline Russian energy relations which she felt. after ciLing some controversial
incidents, were too susceptible to the whims of the Kremlin. The EU Incets some
competition by, amongst others, China and India for access to Russia's abundant
energy resources. This places Russia in a particularly strong position. Germany has
been promoting a strong EU-Russia energy partnership. Petra Dolata-Krcutzkamnp,
Canada-Germany-EL Energy security and climate change, 63 INIJ. 665, 669 (2008). It is
also interesting to note Dolata-KicutLzamp's views on changing perceptions on energy
policy in Germany. Since the late 1950s, energy policy was an economics rather than
strategic matter for western Germany's government; a matter for the ministry for the
economy rather than for defense or foreign affairs. This led to the historical
development of energy policy along the lines of the promotion of markets and market
regulation. This approach was inadequate in the face of the geostrategic realities at
play. In that sense, energy had been somewhat depoliticized for Germany which
consequently suffered the consequences of few energy strategic relationships. However,
Germany seems to have made up for lost time recently.
140. See Korkmaz, supra 9, at 14-15 (discussing Gerinan-Russian bilateralisn in
energy matters and Germany's pledge [o underwrite the Nord Stcain project to the
tune of I billion Euros).
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promote the Nabucco pipeline,141 in the case of Italy, possibly,
on account of its energy industry's interests, and in the case of
Hungary, as a means towards decreased EU gas dependence on
Russia.'4  In this example we see the disparity between interests,
or rather between the rationales that may underpin the external
energy strategy that each member state may want to promote to
be adopted at the EU level.14
As we have alluded to so far, the EU faces geostrategic
challenges quite unlike its comparatively similar economic
peer-the United States. There are geological and geostrategic,
along with structural reasons for this-geological and
geostrategic in that the United States is likely to become energy
independent by 2030144; structural in that whilst the United
States is a fully federalized entity in certain respects, the EU is
constrained by competence issues when it comes to pursuing
external energy relations. Whilst the United States is 20% energy
dependent and moving closer to energy independence, 4 5 the
141. The natural gas pipeline called Nabucco is supposed to bring gas from the
Middic East and Central Asia to Europe via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and
Austria. The project is geopolitically significant on enertgy-security grounds because it
will bypass Russia.
142. See Hungay considers Azerbaijan as guarantr ofEurope's energy security, TREND,
http:/cn.trend.az/capital/nergy/2095611.htmil (last visited Apr. 8. 2013); see also A
NEw ARCHITECTURE FOR EU GAS SECURITYOF SUPPLY, aean-Michel Glachant et al. eds.,
2012).
143. As a previous EU Comnnissioner for trade, Peter Mandelson rather tellingly
has said: "No one country reveals our differences as does Russia." INT'I HERAIDI)
TRIBUNE, Apr. 21-22, 2007, at 3.
144. "Energy developments in the United States are profound and their effect will
be felt well beyond North America-and the energy sector. The recent rebound in US
oil and gas production, driven by upstream technologies that are unlocking light tight
oil and shale gas resources, is spurring econonuc activity-with lss expensive gas and
electricity prices giving industry a competitive edge-and steadily changing the role of
North America in global energy trade. By around 2020, the United States is projected
to become the largest global oil producer (overtaking Saudi Arabia until the mid-
2020s) and starts to see the impact of new fuel-efficiency measures in transport. The
result is a continued fall in US oil imports, to the extent that North America becomes a
net oil exporter around 2030. This accelerates the switch in direction of international
oil trade towards Asia, putting a focus on the security of the strategic routes that bring
Middlk East oil to Asian markets. The United States, which currently imports around
20% of its total energy needs, becomes all but self-sufficient in nct terms-a dramatic
reversal of the trend seen in most other energy-importing countries." INT'i ENERGY




EU is far from ever reaching such a privileged position. As we
mentioned earlier, the EU is 5 2 % energy dependent.14 In other
words, it relies for just over half of its entire energy needs on the
outside world. This relative weakness is compounded by the fact
that the largest part of its primary energy mix comes from just
four providers (Norway, Russia, Algeria, and Libya).147 It also
competes for energy with the rest of the world, including with
those energy-poor behemoths of energy consumption that are
the 'emerging' economies of China and India,14 8 that are likely
to amount for more than 4 5 % of the increase in global energy
consumption by 2035.149 However, the EU's total energy needs
are only a fragment of global energy needs. As we mentioned
earlier, the EU's energy consumption has been fairly static since
1990 and is projected to be so till 2035 at an annual figure not
exceeding 2,000 Mtoe.i5 0 And it may be that competition from
China and India alongside other net consumers such as Japan is
not too great a concern given that: a. the EU is shifting towards
a lower carbon and a more energy efficient economy-a fact
that, logically, could lead to reduced energy consumption-and
b. the existing suppliers of the EU-particularly, Russia-are
endowed with sufficient energy reserves to continue to meet the
needs of multiple consumers.'s'
146. Key Figures, supra note 15, at 5.
147. Serious concerns were raised when attacks on oil and gas facilities took place
in Algeria in January 2013. See, e.g., Benoit Faucon. BP Report Warned ofRisks in Algeria,
WAIL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2013, http://onine.wsj.con/article/SBl1000142412788732416
2304578301982286838010.hiil.
148. Brazil, Indonesia, and Russia possess their own energy supply and so we have
not listed them along with China and India in relation to consumer competitors of the
EU. Brazil, Russia, India, and China are commonly aggregated and referred to as the
'BRIC' countries-a term coined by Jim O'Neill, an economist at Goldman Sachs. The
expansion of this term has been witnessed as 'BRIICS' as to include Indonesia and
South Arica. For an exposition of trade relations between the EU and major emerging
economics, see generally Rafael Leal-Aicas, The European I ion and New Leading Powers:
Towards Partnership in Strategic Trade Policy Areas, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 345 (2009);
Rafael Leal-Aicas, The European Union and the BRIC Countries Unilateralism, Bilateralism,
and Multilateralisn, in THE EU IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 91 (Finn Laursen
ed., 2009).
149. The IEA projects that India and China are likely to be responsible for
roughly forty-five percent of the increase in global energy consumption between 2007
and 2030. See INT'L ENERc; AGENCY, supra note 31, at 3.
150. Key Figures, supra note 15, at 3.
151. In relation to this point, see an interview with Professor Jonathan Stern
where, in relation to EU-Asian competition for Russian gas, he states that: "I've never
2013] 1273
1274 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 36:1225
As it currently stands, the EU is surrounded by energy
significant states-Russia, Norway, those in the MENA region,
the Caspian region, and the CIS-that all, presumably, see a
lucrative energy export market in the EU. Also, developments in
the storage and transportation of natural gas-namely, its
conversion into liquefied form (LNG)-could potentially lead to
the globalization of the gas markets that are currently highly
regionalized due to the challenges around storage and
transportation.1 52 The implications of this for EU energy security
could be positive, as a more globalized gas market may lead to
greater energy flows becoming available on global markets.
What is more, the EU-through Denmark (specifically, its
control over Greenland), Finland, and Sweden-borders an
increasingly energy significant region, i.e., the Arctic. Denmark,
Finland and Sweden-rather than the EU in any sus juris
capacity-are involved in ongoing negotiations between the
group of states with interests in that region. However, energy
exploration and exploitation is far from straightforward given
the presence of competing claims in the region. The five states
with immediate borders who could potentially claim exclusive
economic zone imterests up to 200 miles from their coastlines-
namely, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the US-have
not reached any resolution so far. What the Arctic issue also
brings to the surface are questions as to what ought to be the
EU's stance. Whilst the EU does not participate sui juris in the
Arctic Council-unlike the above five states-developing a
common approach is complicated not least because not all 28
member states are affected in the same way.l Should EU
thought that was an argument worth talking about. Russia has vast amounts of gas in
Asia, very far away from Europe that wouldn't be economic to transport to Europe. At
the same time, they've got a huge amount of gas in eastern Siberia and far cast
provinces which is stranded and not going anywNhere, so for me there's no real
competition between Europe and Asia for Russian gas." Interview wvith Professor
Jonathan Stern, Chairman and Senior Research Fellow, Oxford Inst. for Energy
Studies, Natural Gas Programme, in Vienna, Austria (Dec. 3, 2012), available at
http://www naturalgaseurope.corn/europes-biggest-gas-supplier-no-bluffing-goback=
%2Egdc_1808658_member 191862754.
132. See D~ick de Jong et al., The Evolving Role of LNG in the Gas Mlarket, in GLOBAL
ENERGY GOTRNANCE: THE NEW RULES OF THE (AMF 221 (Andreas Goldthau and jan
Martin Witte. eds., 2010).
153. See Hylke Dijkstra, The European Union as an Actor in Arctic Governance, 16
EUR. FORFIGN XFFAIRS REV. 227 (2011) (providing a full exposition of EU action in
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resources be pursued to represent an EU common position
when it is a handful of member states that are likely to benefit?
Should the EU espouse Denmark's interests in the Arctic region
and potentially come into opposition with what has been a
reliable energy partner, i.e., Russia? Is it accurate to say that this
would be in the energy interests of the entire EU? These are the
types of questions that EU policy-makers are possibly examining
in considering how to approach this matter. Once the EU
resolves to take a common position, it is then confronted with
questions around competences. Conceivably, different aspects of
the Arctic question would have to be examined to ascertain the
level of EU competences. A hard diplomatic matter such as this
seems to fall outside the competence remit of the EU. However,
as we have seen earlier, even in such cases where there is no EU
competence, it is possible for the EU to take a common position
so long as it is done on a unanimity basis between member states
in the most potent EU intergovernmental forum i.e., the
Council.' 4
Again, setting aside the structural obstacles-that is to say,
the competence issues-to the EU pursuing a unified external
energy security policy, the EU further faces inherent restrictions
to whatever competences exist for it to pursue such a policy on
behalf of the collective EU interest. Namely, as we discussed
above, the guiding principles of the EU as enshrined in Article
relation to the Arctic). The EU is unlike traditional Arctic actors-namely, Canada,
Denmark. Russia, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, Finland and the US-which are States with
rights and obligations that flow from that status. They all have Arctic strategies. The
Arctic has been on the agenda for the EU since 2008. It is relevant to the EU's energy
security, environmental protection, and maritime policy objcctivcs. See also Commission
of the European Communities, Communication to the European Parliament and the
Council, The European Union and the Arctic Region COM(2008) 763 Final (Nov.
2008).
154. TFEU, supra note 4, art. 352, 2010 0.J. C 83, at 196 ("If action by the Union
should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies defined in the Treatics, to
attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the
necessary powers, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission
and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the
appropriate mcasurcs") (emphasis added). In this respect, the Council is the final
arbiter on whether to espouse a Commission recommendation thus preserving the
primacy of the inter-govercinmental/diplomatic EU institutions (c.g., the Council) over
that of EU supranational institutions (c.g., the Commission) in matters where no
express powers have been granted to EU institutions by the treaties.
2013] 1275
1276 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 36:1225
21 TEU.155 These principles form the broader normative
parameters outside which, all EU external action, consequently,
appears ultra vires.
Let us take as an example cited by Korkmaz 66 the relations
between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the EU. The
EU sought closer energy relations through the promotion of
pro-market regulatory norms. The GCC, however, preferred
strategic partnerships rather than energy relations that were
conditional on market liberalization. Presumably, third-party
states-such as the GCC-would be loath to contract such
international agreements with the EU that, incidentally or
intentionally, seek to depoliticize energy and promote
integrated or more rational market models. Korkmaz also cites
further instances where the inescapable politics of energy at the
inter-state level impact EU interests.' 5 For instance, Central
Asian states have shunned the EU 'neighborhood' like
integration of energy markets and prefer hard contracts. Also,
see how Spanish support of Moroccan interests in Western
Sahara15 8 led to the cancelation of concessions for Spain's
Repsol by Algeria, the latter being a long-term supporter of the
independence movement for Western Sahara. Also, the Algerian
regime relies on oil deals with local tribes as a means of
remaining in power.'5
These are just a few instances where political and
diplomatic considerations-which some might view or even
dismiss as externalities-may actually drive third-party states'
attitudes towards pursuing energy relations with the EU or any
other partner. In short, energy-related national strategies are
155. Ai tice 21 of the TEU mandates that all EU external action Comply with the
following 'guiding principles': "democracy, the rule of law, the universality and
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity,
the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United
Nations Charter and international law". TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 8, art. 21, 2010
0J. C 83, at 28-29.
156. KORKMAZ, supra note 9, at 25.
157. Id. at 25-26.
158. Currently, largely under Moroccan administration. See generally The World
Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Mar. 21, 2013), https://www.cia.gov/library/
publicatiots/the-wvorld-factbook/geos/wi.htm.




developed against complex backdrops, rather than solely within
market/ regulatory contexts. While energy-poor state actors and
groups of states (e.g., the EU) cannot use energy as a diplomacy
tool or weapon to either encourage or coerce behavior of other
states, they can, however, use their tariffs, and generally, their
trade policies as a stick or a carrot in their external relations
with third-party states in a manner that may not be available to
energy-rich states. This is particularly the case for energy-rich
exporter states, whose economies rely principally on energy
revenues due to their being insufficiently diversified or due to
their lack of any other comparative advantage on account of
geological and other factors relevant to their economies. Such
states instead capitalize on their energy relevance, using it as
either a stick or carrot in their foreign relations. This is at odds
with the agenda of the EU and conceivably other significant
energy consumer economies who wish to promote the de-
politicization of energy. The 'international community' is thus
made up of sovereign actors who, whilst legally equal vis-a-vis
one another within the context of Westphalian sovereignty and
the post-WW 11 international legal order,1o actually amount to
an aggregation of disparate parties rather than a cohesive
community per se. Internationally, state actors possess interests,
strengths, and levels of influence that are highly disparate inter
se.
We have seen some of the matters that may push third party
states to prefer strategic partnerships with hard contracts, rather
than regulatory and market convergence with the EU. On the
other hand, as we have also mentioned, the EU is restricted in its
external actions not only by competence issues but also by
inherent limitations on how it may pursue external relations for
matters where competence exists. To be more precise, a proper
application of Article 21 TEU on all instances of EU external
relations-including all consequent EU energy-related
160. Namely, of the United Nations (UN) and of any other legal orders based on
multilateral arrangements to which states are parties and to the extent that such
agreements provide. With the exception of those states that have a privileged position
within the UN by having a sui juris seat in the UN Security Council which places them
apart from the over-whelming majority of sovereign States. Also, inequality between
sovereign StatCs exists within other fora-c.g., the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
where influence is linked to thre cx[c1L of a States voting rigls which, in turn, are
determined by its fiscal contributions to the IMF.
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agreements with third-party states that have poor human rights
records, such as some states in the Caspian and MENA-must
comply with, if not promote, the EU's guiding principles. In that
respect, whilst the EU's strategic energy partners may want a
straightforward partner in their energy dealings with the EU, the
EU is inherently constrained in meeting such expectations. That
is not to say that EU member states' energy needs remain
unaddressed; EU member states continue to engage with the
outside world through their strategic partnerships and through
the operation of regional and global energy markets. At the
general international law level, a plethora of agreements exists
between various configurations of state parties-including EU
states in their own right-e.g., the ECT, bilateral and
multilateral investment treaties (BITs/MITs)161-that establish
the fundamental conditions that facilitate inter-state investment,
trade, and the operation of markets. As we mentioned earlier,
Article 21 TEU does not, on its own strength, restrict external
action pursued by EU member states qua sovereign entities in
their own right. 162
161. Note that BITs form the bulk of international investnent agrecncnts (IIAs),
namely, 2,833 out of 3,164 IAs. Thirty-three out of the 47 IIAs signed in 2011 are BITs.
Sixty-nine BITs were signed in 2010. The number of BITs may be decreasing annually;
however, regionalism (through regional trade agreeimnttis/free trade agrecments and
customs unions) is on the increase. See UNITE) NATIONS CONFERENCF ON TRADE AN)
DEVLOPMIENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2012: TOWARDS A NEW G(ENERATION OF
INVLSTMENT POLICILS, at xx. U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WVIR/2012, U.N. Sales No.
E.12.11.1).3 (2012); see also RAFAEL LEAL-ARCAS, INTERNATIONAL TIRADE ANT)
INVESTMENT LAW: MULTHATERAL, REGTONAL AND TBITATERAL GOVERNANCE 163-268
(2010); Rafael Leal-Aicas, Proliferation of Regional Trade Agreenents: Complementing or
Supplanting Multilateralism? 11 CHL J. INT'L L., 597, 600 (2011); Rafael Leal-Arcas, The
Multilateralization of International Investment Law 35 N.C. J. INT'T L. & COMM. REG.
33(2009); Rafael Leal-Arcas, The Fragmentation of International Trade Law: Is Now the
Time for Variable Geomety?, 12J WORiDIN & TRA1iDE 145(201 1).
162. That said. under international law (nanely under rules of custonary
international law on state responsibility), EU member states in their capacity qua
subjects of international law with treaty-making capacity may be committing an
intcrnational wrong by breaching or otherwise not honoring any of their intcrinational
obligations owed to other subjects of intcrnational law, including to international
organizations. This is a complex field of customary law that, amongst other things, is
concerned with aspects of an obligation at issuc-c.g. whether it flows from jus cogens or
from elsewhere, to whom it is owed. and so on in order to establish who may raise legal
complaints, what action is legally feasible, and what form such action may take. For the
purposes of the present paper, we do not intend to analyze this in any further detail.
However, EU member states have freely consented to be bound by the TEU. At Article
24§3 TEU it is stated that: "The Member States shall support the Union's external and
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Another element to take into account in relation to EU
preference for market liberalization over strategic relations
based on hard contracts of supply is the EU's commitment to
competitive markets. For instance, the Commission-as we said
earlier, theoretically the vanguard of the EU collective interest-
has been critical of long-term energy contracts in the EU and
their implications for competition.16 Contracts often tied prices
and energy trade volumes, and often excluded other players
from the market by placing conditions on final use. For the
Commission, and undoubtedly, for many others, such matters
have distortive effects on trade and competition. Although long-
term contracts are not on their face illegal within the EU
security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and
shall comply with the Union's action in this area. The Member States shall work
together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from
any action which is contrart to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a
cohesivefirce in internation'al relations" TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 8, art. 24, 2010 0.J. C
83 at 30(emphasis added). The implication of this provision is that, potentially, any sui
juris activity on the part of an EU member state that is deemed 'Contrary to the
interests' of the EU could be the subject of objections including legal proceedings
instigated by the Commission in its rolk as vanguard of EU collective interest. In effect.
Article 24 TEU becomes a fuLrther-suprianational-limitation to each member state's
capacity to engage in external affairs. Setting aside whether a member state's legal
system is monist or dualist in terms of its international agreements, in that sense.
Article 24 TEU could be regarded a restriction present in all EU member states'
constitutional landscape by way of their adoption of the TE1U.
163. According to Bellantuono. the Commission found that the IEM was
structurally characterized by long-term contracts that foreclosed supply and with other
restrictions or distribution clauses. The Commission scrutinized contracts for their
effects on the IEM. The Commission then took a dim view of these practices and
became more interventionist on account of its remit to promote /restore competitive
conditions in the IEM. This was intensified when it was granted powers by Council
Regulation No. 1/2003 /ECon the implementation of the rules on competition laid
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. L.1/1. There had also been EU
determinations on alleged anti-competitive practices in the energy markets of EU
member states. For instance, the 2007 Commission's Hearing Officer's determination
in the Distrigas case where a dominant Belgian gas operator had made certain
contractual commitments that disfavored other operators in Belgian markets See
COMMISSION OF THE E UROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FINAL REPORT OF THEF HEARING OFFICER
IN CAVSE COMP/B-1/37.966-DISTRIGAZ (2007), available at http://cc.curopa.cu/
competition/ antitru st/cases/ dec docs/37966/ 37966_594_7.pdf; see also Vereniging
voor Energic, Milieu en Water and Others v. Directeur van de Dienst uitvocring en
toczicht energic, Case C-17/03 [2005] E.C.R. 1- 4983 (analyzing priority rights for
reserying transport capacity for energy goods). Again, an energy actor was forced to
make changes to allow other actors a share of the market. See Giuseppe Bellantuono,
Contract Law, Regulation, and Competition in Energ Alarkets, 10 COMPLTITION & REG.
NETWORK INDUS. 159, 167-75 (2009).
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context, they are to be scrutinized on a case-by-case basis to
assess their impact on the overall market context. The
implications of this is that provisions in long-term contracts
between energy actors based in an EU member state and third-
party supplier states may be set aside if found to be in breach of
EU competition rules. This may affect how desirable long-term
contracts with EU member states might be to third-party
supplier states.
B. Rise in Shale Gas Extraction and its Effect on EUEnergy Security
There are also other developments internationally that have
implications for EU energy security. A fairly recent one is the
rise in shale gas extraction that could potentially translate into
larger volumes of gas becoming available on gas markets.164 This
development has assisted the US on its path towards energy
independence and makes it a potential competitor of Russia as a
supplier of gas to the EU. In what has been lauded as a positive
consequence of the rise of shale gas fracking, gas reserves that
had been too difficult to extract now reach markets. This is a
development that could lead to reduction or even displacement
of coal as a primary input resource for the production of energy.
This is important, given the need to lower the GHG
footprint of energy production. Whilst gas is not emissions-free,
it is less polluting than coal. That said, shale gas, due to the
intensiveness of fracking-the extraction process used-is
environmentally harmful in other ways.'16 In that respect, the
evangelism that surrounds shale gas may be unjustified given
that this energy source is not in the final analysis necessarily
'greener'.166 The geostrategic implications are that greater use of
164. It is worth noting that gas is chiefly traded regionally. Gas markets are largely
more regional than global. That said, the prospect of more gas reserves-be it through
shale fracking or conventional extraction processes-becoming accessible and
exploitabic, alongside technological developments around gas storage and transfer,
may pave the way towards the integration of gas markets into a global gas market. See
Dick de Jong, supra note 149, at 221-45 (discussing developments in gas markets
globally).
165. See BRITISH GEO. SURY., supra note 128.
166. Most astonishing has been Professor Riley's evangelism of shale gas in his
address at the November 2012 workshop on the EU's 'Energy Roadnap 2050'
organized by the European Parliament's Directorate-Gencral for External Policies, in
which he asserted that the US moved from a position where in 2005 it was using coal
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shale gas could potentially undermine the environmental
objectives of the EU and of the international community, whilst
also leading to environmental-including geological-
deterioration in the regions where extraction is taking place.
Naturally, environmental degradation is indifferent towards
territorial boundaries. Often, environmental disasters transcend
boundaries and wreck havoc on adjacent territory-e.g., oil
spills, land subsidence, and so on-or even on territory
considerably further afield, as is the case with rising sea levels,
tsunami reverberations, and other climatic disasters. This is
important to bear in mind when risk-assessing and also
establishing obligations owed to other rights holders under
general and particular international law. For instance trade-
related measures taken by the EU to discourage highly polluting
processes elsewhere in the globe," 7 could be justified under
general international law, and under particular international law
(e.g., within the justifications possible to invoke within the
World Trade Organization (WTO) system).
Despite the warm reception that the rise of shale gas may
meet with, other projections indicate that there may be a
regression towards greater coal reliance. Rising consumption
rates, inadequate investment in upstream and downstream oil
for 50% of energy production to the current 30% due to shale gas, and that the US was
set on becoming energy sclfs ufficient. In the US, gas now costs as low as US$3 per
British Thermal Units (BTUs) whereas the EU price is around US$10-14 per BTU.
What is more, the US has or may have overtaken Russia in gas and could compete with
it for gas sales. Professor Riley ended by advising that the EU ought to adopt policies
that de-link its energy security from its environmental protection commnuitlents See
Energy Roadmap Workshop, supra note 33, at 7.
167. A case in point is an earlier dispute between Canada and the EU in relation
to oil extracted from the tar sand-fields in Alberta, Canada. This tar oil is highly
polluting when compared to conventionally extracted crude oil. The EU Commission
had proposed to the EU membership to agree on labeling such oil 'highly polluting' as
a first step towards introducing measures to discourage its imporLtation and therefore
use of this extraction process. This appears to have not been unanimously endorsed by
EU member states and therefore the proposal was abandoned. Canada's earlier
response is telling however. as it thireatcned action within the WT0. See Int'1 Centre for
Trade and Sustainable Dev.("ICTSD"), Trade Tensions Soar as EU Prepares to Vote on
Canadian Oil, 16 BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWs DIGEST No. 7, 1. 8 (Feb. 22. 2012),
http:/ictsd.org/ downloads/ bridgeswekl y/bridgcswccklyl6-7.pdf; see also Alex Hobbs,
Tar Sands Threaten to Pollute EU Canada Relationship, ST. ANDREW S FOREIGN XFFAIRS REV.
(Oct. 8. 2012), http://foreignaffairsrevicw.co.uk/2012/10/oil-cu-canada/(Suggesting
tLha Canada thought of acting proactively, given tLha it does not export such oil to the
EU).
2013] 1281
1282 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 36:1225
and gas infrastructure, wildly inadequate investment in
renewables, diminishing peak oil and peak gas reserves, and
energy security concerns may all coalesce to push economies
back to coal. Energy production may get a lot dirtier.'68 Also, the
IEA considers it likely that by 2017 global coal consumption is to
stand at 4.32 billion tons of oil equivalent (btoe), versus around
4.40 btoe for oil.169 Naturally, this is most disconcerting given
that more meaningful action is needed to avert the likelihood of
climate change that is both irreversible and catastrophic. In this
respect, how can the EU take meaningful action globally 70
C. Impact of the EU Emissions Trading System
In relation to its environmental protection efforts, the EU
has, amongst other things, set up a sophisticated intra-EU
emissions trading system (EU ETS) within which it is
progressively drawing in all major polluting industries, including
aviation and prospectively the shipping industry. 171 In the case of
aviation, this has rattled many a third-party state, given that the
168. See International Institute for Asian Studies ("IAS"), Chinese and EU Energy
Security. IAS NEWSLETTER No. 62, 21(2012), http://www.iias.nl/Sitcs/dcfault/files/
IIASNL62_FULL.pdf.
169. Coal's Share of Global Eneapg Mix to Continue Rising, with Coal Closing in on Oil
as Worlds Top Energy Source by 2017. IEA (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.ica.org/
newsroomandevents/pressreleases/2012/december/nane,34441,en.html. Nineteen
per cent of the current global energy mix derives from alternative and renewable
energy sources however only 3% comes from rcncwablcs, presumably the balance
comes from nuclear and other alternatives that are neither renewable nor
environmcntally safe. By 2030, no significant changes are anticipated to take place.
Rcncwablcs arc likely to remain marginal to the global energy mix.
170. There are alternative views to the current system on how to tackle climate
change from the bottom up. See RAFAEL LEAILI-ARCAS, C IMATE CHANGE AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADL (2013): Rafael Leal-Aicas. Kyoto and the COPs: Lessons Learned
and Looking Ahead, 23 HAGUE YEARBOOK OF INT'l 1. 17 (2011); Rafael Leal-Arcas, A
Bottom-up Approach for Climate Change: The Trade Experience, 2 ASIAN j. OF L. & EcON. 1,
(2011); Rafael Leal-Arcas, Top-doon versus Bottom-up Approaches for Climate Change
Aegotiations: A Analis, 6 THE IUJ. OF GOVERNANCE AND )PUB. POL'Y No. 4, 7(2011);
Rafael Leal-Arcas, AlternativeAchitecture for Climate Change: Aajor Economies, 4 E UR.J. OF
LEGAL STUD. No. 1, 25 (2011); RaFacl Leal-Arcas, Is the Kyoto Protocol an Adequate
Environmental Agreement to Solve the Climate Change Problem?, 10 EUR. ENVTL. L. REV. 282
(2001); Rafael Leal-Aicas, Combining Top-dozon and Bottom-up Approaches for Climate
Change Negotiations, OUTREACH, http:,//ww.stakeholderforum.org/sf/outreach/
index.php/copl7day4home/490-cop (last visited May 30, 2013).
171. See The EU Emissions Trading System, EUR. COIMI. (Jan. 4, 2013),
http: //cc.curopa.cu/clhina/policis/ct s/i dexcn.tmLll.See also Rafael Leal-Aicas,
Unilateral Trade-related Climate Change Measures, 13. WORLD INV. & TRADE 875, (2012).
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EU ETS regime had been extended to all airline operators with
flights that enter or depart from EU territory)' 2 What is more,
the inclusion of aviation was also opposed by the EU aviation
industry. Following sustained opposition, the EU caved in and
announced a year-long moratorium on 12 November 2012 that
suspends the application of the EU ETS on flights that are not
entirely limited to EU territory .1 Whilst, rather self-servingly,
various industries would want the EU ETS to fail, it is an
example of environmentally minded action that ought to be
supported and replicated globally. We say this because the EU
ETS goes way beyond any other instance of inter-state
cooperation on the protection of the environment within the
context of the UNFCCC, the WTO, or elsewhere. 74 The EU ETS
has proven worthwhile in that during 2011, of the 8,081 million
tons of CO2e that were globally traded through emission credits,
7,853 were traded through the EU ETS-in other words, the
value of EU ETS transactions stood at US$147.8 billion whilst
the value of global transactions stood at US$148.8 billion.17 5
In this respect, the EU ETS is an example of EU action that
has implications for third-party states. Conceivably, discontent
on the part of third-party states in relation to what they may
regard as EU unilateral action could lead to their taking hostile
action against the EU's interests abroad, including in
connection with its energy security efforts. Whether this is a risk
worth taking really depends on the effect of EU action. Whilst
measures aimed at the protection of the environment-such as
the EU ETS, whose inherent value is that it seeks to contain
emissions within EU territory-are always worth encouragement
in the grander scheme of things, it may be that their benefit is
disproportionate to the consequential cost-e.g., to the
172. China, India, and Saudi Arabia, amongst others, have instructed their airlines
not to comply. See Energy related-the proposed extension of the EU emissions trading
system to aviation, TRADING POWERS (Apr. 14, 2012),
http://lawonglobaltradeinenergyandfoodcoimmodities.wordpress.coi/2012/04/14/
cu-ets/.
173. See E. Aviation Industry Clash over Enissions Scheme, 16 BRIDGES WEEKIY
TRAIDL NLWS DIGEST No. 21, INT'L CENTRE FORTRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DLV., (May 30,
2012), http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/)134007.
174. See THE WORLD BANK, STATE AND TRENDS OF THE CARBON MARKET REPORT
2012. at 73-104 (2012) (discussing initiatives elsewhere including Australia, South
Korea, and the United States).
175. Id. at 10.
2013] 1283
1284 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 36:1225
economic damage by likely retaliatory responses on the part of
third-party states. To make this clear, let us list some figures
around global emitters: The greatest GHG emitting economies
globally, in terms of absolute volumes of emissions during 2007
were: China (c. 6,538 million tons of C02), the US (c. 6,094
mtCO2), the EU (c. 4,200 mtCO2), India (c. 1,610 mtCO2),
Russia (c 1,580 mtCO2), Japan (c. 1,303 mtCO2), Canada (c.
590 mtCO2), South Korea (c. 503 mtCO2), Iran (c. 495
mtCO2), Mexico (c. 471.46 mtCO2) Saudi Arabia (c. 402
mtCO2), Indonesia (c. 397 mtCO2), Australia (c 396 mtCO2),
and Brazil (368.32 mtCO2).76 In terms of C02 emissions per
capita or per territorial span (measured in square kilometers), a
different picture emerges.17 However, the point we wish to
make is this: whilst is it is a laudable move on the part of the EU
to act responsibly in terms of its highly polluting global impact
in implementing the EU ETS territorially, it is less clear how
proportionate it is for the EU to seek to extend the scope of the
EU ETS to foreign industries-in the way that the EU had
attempted to do so regarding foreign aviation industries that
operated flights with portions within EU territory-when,
176. These figures are based on 2007 data available on the United Nations
Statistics Division. In the case of the EU. the global figur cCited by the authors is based
on the individual figures for all 27 EU member states (before the accession of Croatia
to the EU on I july 2013 as the 2 8 " member of the EU) excluding their overseas
territories. We have done this in order to get a figure regarding man-made emissions
that would correspond to the territorial reach of the EU ETS. See Environmental
Indicators: Greenhouse Gas Emissions, UNITED NATIONS STAT. DIT. (July 2010),
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/ENVIRONMENT/airco2_cmissions.htm.
177. The highest polluting economics in terms of tons of C02 per capita during
2007 were: Qatar (c. 55.4 tCO2), Dutch Antilles (c. 32 tCO2), the United Arab
Emirates (c. 3 LC02), Kuwait (c. 30 LC02), Bahrain (c. 29 LC02), Luxembourg (c. c.
25 LC02), Aruba (c. 23 LC02), Brunci (c. 19.8 LC02), the US (c. 19.7 tC02). the
Falkland Islands (c. 19.6 tCO2), Australia (c.19 tCO2), and Canada (c. 18 tW2). We
have no global figure for the EU average given that the figure per EU member state
would have a different weighting on the EU average due to the disparate population
sizes. However, if we were to discount the highest EU member state igure-namely,
Luxembourg (c. 25 LC02 per capita)-thc next offenders in the EU are: Estonia (c. 14
tC02). the Czech Republic (c. 12.6 LC02), and Finland (c. 12.5 LC02). The remaining
EU member states vary from around 3.7 to 11.4 tCO2 per capita. Id. Eurostat figures
from 2009 suggest that the EU figure per capita for C02 emissions from fuel
combustion stood at around c. 7 LC02 per capita. Also according to this set of figures,
whereas Russia stood at 10.8 tCO2, China at circa 5 tCO2, India at 1.3 tCO2, and Brazil
at 1.7 tC02 per capita. See LUROSTAT POCKETBOOKS, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE
BRIC COUNTRIES 108 (2012 ED.), available athLtp://cpp.curostaL.cc.curopa.cut/cacic/
ITY OFFPUll/KS-31-11-414/EN /KS-31-11-414-LN.PDF.
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potentially, it could have to face retaliatory action on the part of
third-party states.
Looking at the geostrategic context in relation to the
energy needs of the EU, let us briefly examine some aspects of
the EU external relations with the outside world.
D. EU External Energy Relations
The EU has strategic partnerships with all BRIC
countries.178 Whilst the EU does not deal with the BRICs as a
single group, it does so bilaterally. 17 Whilst the BRIC countries
have certain aspects in common-including large populations,
wide territorial span, and rapid economic growth-they are also
separated from each other, and from the EU, by significant
economic, social and political differences. Brazil and Russia are
major energy significant economies in that they are net
exporters par excellence, whilst the opposite is the case for China
and India. Out of the BRICs, they are the ones that rely on
energy imports for their economic growth. However, the
emergence of the BRICs has been powered by the prodigious
use of highly polluting hydrocarbons. The fast pace of
development has caused unprecedented environmental impacts
in those economies, and globally, in terms of hydrocarbon
combustion-related emission increases. However, whilst China
remains the highest emitting economy in absolute terms, it is
taking a lead in investment in renewables and reforestation. In
that respect, China appears to be an environmentally
responsible energy consumer. so
178. This is the case beyond the field of energy. See, e.g. Rafael Leal-Arcas, The
European 1hion and New Leading Powers, supra note 145; Rafael Leal-Aicas. How Will the
EUAppoach the BRIC Countres Future Trade Challenges, 2 VIENNA . INT'L CONST. L 235
(2008).
179. See, e.g., Rafael Leal-Arcas. The European Union vis-a-vis Brazil and India: Future
Avenues in Selected Trade Policy Areas, 2 INT'L J. OF PRIVATE L. 109 (2009); Rafael Leal-
Aicas, The EU and Brazil: Trading Partners in Different Fora, 8 THE JEAN
MONNLT/ROBERT SCHUMAN PAPER SERIES 1 (2008).
180. However, this is not the case in terms of the implications that Chinese energy
diplomacy has on global human security. China is involved in aid-for-oil relations with
Arican States. This is problematic when it involves States such as Sudan (before the
secession of South Sudan) and Zimbabwe, and has implications for human security in
those States. For instance, China may have opposed UN Security Council action in
relation to the massacre in Sudan possibly due to its energy interests in the region. This
sort of horse-trading is sadly the order of the day in diplomatic circles. It is not specific
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In relation to Chinese and EU relations, there has been
bilateral activity. 181 The EU and China currently amount to
about a third of global energy consumption, with the share of
China projected to rise over the next two decades.',2 In May
2012 the EU and China issued joint declarations in relation to
energy, including energy security."" In December 2012 a high-
level conference was held in Beijing in connection to one of
those declarations-namely, the EU-China joint Declaration on
Energy Security-to look at ways to cooperate on energy-related
matters. Areas of cooperation include nuclear safety (in light of
Fukushima), energy security, and the promotion of
environmental policies including greater use of renewables. 84
What is more, the EU and China have shared interests in the
MENA region given that energy transit states such as Yemen and
Egypt are of critical importance to their security of supply.
Again, to whatever extent EU competences permit, the EU and
to China. Taking the post-WWVII era alone, the United States and other Western states
have also promoted their cconomic-including their energy-interests at a great
human cost to their societies and to the societies of other states-e.g., in relation to the
two Iraq wars, support for thc 1953 Iranian coup d'etat in thc aftermath of oil
nationalizaLtiols, and so on. Western gcostratcgic interests in various regions-
including MENA, Caspian, Latin American, and Sub-Saharan regiois-have aided, and
consequently benefited from installing, repressive reginics.
181. See The European Union and China: A Maturing Partneship, DELLGATION OF
THE EUR. UNION TO CHINA, http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china/eu china/
political rclations/ idexcnhtmi (last visited May 31, 2013) (discussing thc EU's
breadth of external action with China); see also, Energy from Abroad: China, EUROPEAN
COMMIsSION, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/bilateral-cooperation/
china/china-en.htm (last visited May 31, 2013) (discussing EU-China energy
relations). On EU-China trade relations. see Rafael Leal-Aicas, European Union-China
Trade Relations, 2 TRADE, I. & DFV. 224 (2010).
182. Key Figures, supra note 15. at 3.
183. The three Joint Declarations signed on 3 May 2012 in Brussels are thc Joint
Statement for Enhanced Cooperation on Electricity Markets between the European
Commission and thc State Electricity Regulatory Commission of China, the EU-China
Partnership on Urbanisation, and the EU-China Joint Declaration on Encrtgy Security.
See Cooperation on Energy Security: China, DEIFGATION OF THF EUROPEAN UNION TO
CHINA, http://ccas.curopa.cu/dclcgatioIS/china/presscorner/allnews/news/2012/
20121213 01 cnLhti (last visited May 31, 2013).
184. See Cooperation on Energy Security: China-EU Government and Business




China could coordinate responses to events that disrupt their
energy supplies.18s
In relation to Russia, we have briefly referred to aspects of
its energy relations with the EU. .'86 Russia is a key EU energy
partner in terms of its oil, gas, and biofuels exports.1 7 As
mentioned earlier, a steady supply of gas-which is less polluting
than oil and coal for the production of energy-alongside
biofuel imports could considerably enhance EU efforts towards
a low-carbon economy.
Also as mentioned earlier, the fact that there may be rising
demand competition for the EU by China and India is perhaps
less of a concern when one considers the vast Russian reserves
and their wide distribution across Russian territory. The
implication of this is that Russia needs a healthy EU energy
market as much as the EU needs a steady supply of energy from
Russia. However, as we have also alluded to, relations are
complicated in that EU member states, due to historical and
185. China and EU member states currently cooperate in various fora. For
instance, in the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate Change (MEF), which
is a recent development that brings together 17 major economics-namely Australia,
Brazil, Canada, China. the EU, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, haly, Japan, Korea,
Mexico, Russia, South Africa, the UlK, and the US--ith net energy importer
econonics such as the EU. India, China and the United States, alongside net energy
exporters such as Brazil, Russia. and Mexico. It was set up at the instance of the US-as
the 'Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change'-to act as a
negotiations' anteroom for the most cmissions-significant cconomies in rclation to
wider UN negotiations on climate change that were taking place. Purportedl, the MEF
is also concerned with: "... advanc[ing] the exploratior of core t iitiatives and joir
ventures that increase the supply of clean eerg while cutting geenhouse gas emissins See
About, MAJOR ECON. FORUM ON ENLR(GY & CLINATE,
http://wwwNa.moreconomiesforurm.org/about.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2013). Also,
China participates in the International Energy Foruin-which brings together OPEC
and IEA incinbers-in the G8+5 formin, the G20, and also on a more informal footing
directly wvith the IEA. See Non-mnemnber Countries, INT'l ENERCN AGFNCY,
http://ww.iea.org/ countries/non-membercountries (last visited Apr. 8, 2013).
186. See Russia, EUR. COIMN, http: //cc.curopa.eu /trade/ creating-
opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/russia (last visited Apr. 8, 2013) (providing
a run-down on EU-Russia trade relations). The Commission states: "Russia is the third
trading partner of the EU and the EU the first trading partner of Russia [...] The main
EU imports from Russia are oil (crude and refined: C130 billion) and gas (C24 billion).
For these products, as well as for other important raw materials, Russia has committed
to limit its export duties. The EU is the largest foreign investor in Russia, with
investments worth around C120 billion in 2010. Russian investments in the EU
amounted to C42 billion in 2010."Id.
187. See generally DYNAMICS OF ENLRGY GOVERNANCL IN EUROPL AND RUSSIA
(Caroline Kuzemko et al. eds., 2012).
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economic reasons, have very different attitudes towards EU
energy dependence on Russia. The much publicized, and
perhaps somewhat misunderstood, recent gas disputes between
Russia and Ukraine also compounded these attitudes when
several EU states consequently experienced energy shortages.'
We have also referred to the constitutionally entrenched
need for EU external action to be consistent across the EU
policy spectrum. Often this means that bilateral legal relations
between the EU and third-party states, including Russia, are not
strictly realpolitik in that they involve enlightened conditionalities
(e.g., in relation to the promotion of the rule of law, human
rights, and civil liberties). 18 This can be problematic as,
understandably, the Kremlin may balk at what may appear to it
as hypocritical lecturing on the part of the West. However, it is
helpful for Russian policy-makers to understand that in its
dealings with the outside world, EU institutions per se do not
have a free hand in how they engage, but must do so within the
existing competence parameters. Again, as we have said, this
leaves EU member states largely able to pursue closer
bilateral/ multilateral relations outside the EU context. That
said, the EU and Russia have had a Partnership and
188. Ukraine has historically enjoyed prices for Russian gas exports that were
lower than the prices for gas exports destined for EU markets. It appears that some sort
of agreement had been in place between Russian and Ukrainian energy operators, and
the respective governments, that involved transit for subsidized gas prices. Presumably,
the pro-western stance of a section of the Ukrainian political establishment, which had
previously sought NATO membership, antagonized Russia into using its energy
advantage as a political tool by announcing increases to the subsidized gas prices
destined for Ukraine for domestic consumption. Consequently, Ukraine attempted to
reserve gas for its own needs at the previous prices, which meant that Russian gas
intended for EU markets was held in Ukraine. This resulted in several EU states
experiencing energy shortages. See Q&A: Russia-Ukraine gas row, lilC NFWAS Jan. 20,
2009), http://ncws.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/worlde/u rope/7240462.stm. Tension between
Russian gas company Gazprom and Ukraine continues because Ukraine failed to
import agreed natural-gas in 2012, which, in turn, has meant disruption of gas supply
to the EU in the past. Anna Shiryacvskaya & Daryna Krasnolutska, Gazprom Sends
Ukraine $7 Billion Bill as Gas Dispute Deepens, BLOOMBLRG, Jan. 28, 2013,
http://wNy.bloomberg.com/nevs/2013-01-27/gazprom-sends-7-biilion-bill-to-naftogaz-
as-gas-disput e-dccpcns.htil. For background information on Ukrainc-NATO relations,
see NATO's Relations with (kraine, NORTH ATLANTIC TRLATY Org., http://www.nato.int/
cps/ en/SID-E2280ADF-116517 1 /natolive/topics_37750.htm (last visited Apr. 8,
2013).
189. For a fuller exposition of EU-Russia trade relations, see Rafael Leal-Arcas. The
EU and Russia as Energy Trading Partners: Friends or Foes?, 14 EFA REV. 337(2009).
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Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in place since 1994. Whilst this
PCA has expired (namely in 2007, 10 years after being ratified in
1997), this has not inhibited mutual trade and investment
flows. 'o However a new PCA has yet to be concluded.9'
Conceivably, energy and social reform matters might have made
for complicated negotiations.
Furthermore, the exceptionally large energy resource
endowments of Russia mean that its interests in energy-related
multilateralism, and, consequently, its stance towards it, can be
very different to those of energy net importing states. For
instance, Russia, whilst initially having signed, never ratified the
Energy Charter Treaty ("ECT") when it informed the ECT
Secretariat of its decision to withdraw."9 It is helpful to think of
the ECT as Plan B to what had been Plan A of Western net
energy importing states-namely, to conclude an energy-specific
agreement within the context of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO system.'0  Whilst the ECT
190. On EU-Russia trade relations. see Rafael Leal-Arcas. EU Relations with China
and Russia: How to Approach new Superpowers in Trade Matters, 4 J. INT'L COM. LAW &
TECH. 22 (2009).
191. See EU Relations with Russia, EUR. UNION EXTLRNAL ACTION,
http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/indexen.htn (last visited Apr. 8, 2013). It is stated that:
'Negotiations on a New EU-Russia Agreeinnt were launched at the Khanty-Mansyisk
Summit in June 2008. The New Agrenint should update and replace the existing
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. It should provide a comprehensive
framework for EU-Russia relations, and include substantive, lkgally binding
commitments in all areas of the partnership, including political dialogue, JLS issues,
economic cooperation, research, education and culture, as well as solid provisions on
trade, investment and energy. The negotiations were startcd in July 2008, and by the
end of 2010, 12 full negotiating rounds will have taken place." Id.
192. The Energy Charter Treaty ("ECT") currently has 54 Members of which 49
have ratified. See iembers & Observers, ENERGY CHARTER, http://wNyentcharter.org/
index.php?id=61&L=0 (last visited Apr. 8. 2013). Paries that have ratified may
withdraw after the conclusion of the first five years after ratification. What is more,
parties remain bound by ECT investment protection obligations for 20 years post-
withdrawal. See Energy Charter Treaty ("ECT"), art. 47, 34 ILM 373 (1995), at 91
[hereinafter ECT]. For those parties who have signed but not ratified, it is possible to
withdraw with effect within a shorter tineframe-nanely 60 calendar days, as was the
case of Russia, which had not ratified the ECT before its notification to withdraw. See id.
at 90.We mentioned in a previous footnote that the Belenux states, in their March 2006
common 'Position Paper on Enertgy Security and Foreign Policy' addressed to the
European Council, had recommended that the EU should push Russia to ratify the
ECT.
193. See THOM\AS W. W ALDL, THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY: AN EAST-WLST
GATEWAY FOR INVESTMENT AND TRADE (1996) (providing a fuller analysis on the ECT,
its history, and for a more critical perspective).
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expressly enshrines sovereignty over natural resourcesl' -a
truism under international law as welll 95-it also protects
investor interests in the jurisdictions of ECT members in that it
entrenches the legal right to compensation when expropriations
are carried out on the part of the ECT party that is the host
state.196 As an aside, it is worth pointing out that the ECT does
not obligate its parties to liberalize their energy markets, to
permit inward flows of foreign investment, nor to provide
energy exploitation contracts to all ECT parties on a non-
discriminatory basis. Broadly, what it does is provide disciplines
for energy-sector foreign investment once this has been
welcomed in the territory of an ECT party.
In sum, once investments take place within ECT party
territories, ECT parties must provide indiscriminate treatment
between foreign investors, and among foreign investors and
domestic investors (on the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) and
National Treatment bases). Incidentally, on 23 November 2012,
the ECT parties agreed to begin the process of updating the
ECT during successive rounds of negotiations-known as the
Warsaw Process-to take place in Warsaw, Poland. This has been
argued as necessary to meet current demands and to also draw
in membership from other regions.'0 7 Despite the situation
194. See ECT, supra note 192, art. 18, at 62.
195. See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT43
(2nd ed. 2004). Sornarajah refers to the notion of permanent soxvercignty over natural
resources (PSNR) as: "[merely] asr[ing] um in international law that th soveignty
of a State includes control over all pesons, incidents, and substances within a State unless such
control has been removed bT treaty" Id. (emphasis added).In other words, there must be
previous State consent for any erosion of PSN R.
196. See ECT, supra note 192, art.10-17, at 53-61. The ECT cxclusixely deals with
obligations to protect foreign investment, thus elevating investor interests to legally
protected rights flowing frorn the ECT. These include the right to compeiation, which
embeds the Hull formula of conpensation,-i.c., that it be 'prompt, adcquate, and
efficient', naeind after Cordell Hull, the US Secretary of State in 1938, who articulated
the US's position in relation to the expropriations carried out by the Mexican state
during the Mexican Revolution of 1910. Id. art. 12(2), at 56. The ECT also heavily
restricts sovereign rights of expropriation so that expropriations may be permissible to
the extent they are ECT-cornpliant. Id. art. 13, at 57.
197. See MWenber Countries Give Green Light to the Modernisation of the 1991 Energ
Charter. ENLRGY (HARTLR (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.cncharter.org/index.php?
id=21&idarticle=334&L=0. The article states that: "Today the Energy Charter
Conference at its 23rd Meeting adopted a historic decision to proceed with the
modernzation of the 1991 Energy Charter the founding docuient of [he Energy
Charter Process. Fully supporting the fundamental principles contained in the 1991
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concerning Russia's withdrawal from the ECT, it is interesting to
note that the EU is the largest foreign investor in Russia, with
investments worth around C120 billion in 2010. Russian
investments in the EU amounted to C42 billion in 2010.198
E. Role of the World Trade Organization
The WTO system handles the trade aspects of energy to the
extent that its norms extend to energy commodities-be they
goods or services-that are traded between W\TO members. It is
important to note that these norms do not extend to the pre-
extraction stage. In that sense, they too preserve the notion of
sovereignty over natural resources.1s9 However, once natural
resources have been extracted and are being traded, WTO
members must comply with WTO norms including the
prohibition of quantitative restrictions2oo on trade flows that are
otherwise inconsistent with the specific commitments each W\TO
member had, at the time of accession, contracted with the 11TO.
This has important implications, say, for energy resource
endowed WTO members who may want to restrict energy or
other types of exports or imports in ways that the various WTO
agreements do not allow.2o' For instance, Russia, which became
a W\TO Member in August 2012, might conceivably have views
on the W\TO implications for its energy endowments that are at
odds with those of energy net importing 1TO members.
Charter, under which they have all put their signatures over the years, Charter member
countries agreed that this important document required updating. The realitics of the
world of energy of the 21st century need to be addressed by the Energy Charter
Process, as does the changing focus of the Charter, which now goes beyond the
traditional link between Western Europe and Forimer Soviet countries and on to new
regions of the globe."
198. See Russia, supra note 186.
199. For further details on the link between the WTO and natural resources. see
Ehab Abu-Gosh and Rafael Leal-Arcas, The Conservation ofExhaustible Natural Resources
in the GATT and WTO: Implications for the Consevation of Oil Resources, 14 J. OF WORLD
INV. & TRADL, Vol. 14, No 3. 480-531, 2013.
200. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XI, 33 ILM 1153 (1994), at
17-18 [hereinafter GATT].
201. There had been three complaints (namely complaints WT/DS431/6,
WT/DS432/6 and WT/DS433/6) against China and a measure that restricted exports
of rare earth innerals. See Panel established on China's rare earths exports, WORLD TRADL
ORG. (July 23, 2012), http: //ww.wto.org/cnglish/n ewsc/news12_c/
dsb_23jul12_e.htrn (last visited Apr. 8, 2013).
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One measure that has been a source of contention is
Russia's practice of maintaining different prices for gas sold
domestically and that destined for foreign markets. This issue
has concerned the Commission to the extent that it took
unilateral action, irrespective of whether it was proven that any
HTO norms had been breached. The Commission did this by
raising duties on imports that it had deemed had benefited from
cheaper production costs due to lower domestic gas prices. 202
The recent gas disputes between Ukraine and Russia, which
led to EU energy flow disruptions, had negative implications for
EU energy security. About 20% of the EU gas supply transits
through Ukraine20S. EU member states acted unilaterally-in
this case with German Chancellor Angela Merkel holding
discussions with Russian President, Vladimir Putin. This
approach has been criticized as another missed opportunity for
the EU to speak with one voice204. In 2011, the EU Commission
made a series of policy recommendations to the EU Council and
Parliament that included measures to speed up the integration
of the Ukraine into the EnC, by instituting political and
administrative tri-partite cooperation involving the EU, Russia,
and Ukraine to ensure steady gas supplies from Russia through
202. See POGORETSKAY & BEHN, Supra note 39, at 10(analyzing of the relationship
between Russia's dual pricing practice and the various WTO provisions that may be
engaged). Pogoretskyy and Behn inform us that the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (i.e., the World Bank) advised that Russian domestic
gas prices ought to rise at least to a levcl that Incets production costs. This is
incrementally happening. Also, Pogoretskyy and Behn believe that Russia is likely to
reach a point where there would be total harmony between both gas prices by 2014.
They also feel that this will not be due to external pressure. rather, due to economic
reasons-nanely so that the Russian State would be able to fund the enormous capital
investments necessary to modernize and further develop its energy infrastructure. See
also YUITA SELIVANOVA, ENERGY DUAL PRICING IN WTO LAw: ANAYSIS AND )PROSPFCTS
IN THL CONTEXT OF RLSSLA'sACCESSION TO THLWTO, Ch. 2 (2008).
203. See On Security of Energy Supply, supra note 108, at 5.
204. See Florian Baumnann, supra note 10, at 15. Baumann states that: "[I]t took
the EU quite some time to understand what was really happening. Soon after Brussels
recognized that this was not simply a trade dispute, a common EU approach was
challenged by several bilateral moves, including Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel
meeting independently with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Thus, the Union
had once again missed an opportunity to 'speak with one voice'. NATO, for its part, did
not show any public reaction at all. However, this criisis in particular revealed not only
how import-dependent countries suffer from such a dispute but also how exporters
who are reliant on the revenue from energy trade are negatively affected." Id. at 78.
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Ukraine. 20s Evidence shows that tension between Russia and
Ukraine remains as recently as January 2013 over gas transit
disputes, where Ukraine received US$7 billion bill from
Gazprom for taking less gas than originally contracted2on and
Russia's Gazprom rejected an appeal by Ukraine to renegotiate
its gas supply contract.2o7
This is an example where it becomes evident how reliant
the functioning of the IEM is on external action aimed at supply
security. The Russia-Ukraine gas dispute brought to the fore
energy transit issues.20s The EU, its constituent members, Russia,
and Ukraine are all WTO members. GATT Article V relates to
goods that temporarily enter the territory of a member and that
are destined for consumption outside that territory. Article V
mandates that such goods be exempt from customs duties and
other encumbrances. It that respect, it enshrines the freedom of
transit of commodities across the territories of the WTO
membership.Mo This duty requires that the most convenient
route be made available to such traffic and that transit be free
from unjustified restrictions. 2 1  There is debate as to whether
205. See On Security of Energy Supply, supra note 108, at 5.
206. See Roman Olearchyk, Russia and Ukraine Adopt Poker Faces as Questions Loom
Over USD7bn Gas Bill, FIN. TiMfS (Feb. 8, 2013, 6:09 PM), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-
brics/2013/02/08/russia-and-ukrainc-adopt-poker-faces-as- questions-loom-over-7bn-
gas-bill/#axzz2Kxsij9im.
207. Guy Chazan, Gazprom Rejects Kiev Gas Contract Plea, FIN.TImES (Feb. 14, 2013,
4:43 PM). http://ww.ft.coi/intl/cms/s/0/4 9f8c k-75d8-11c2-9891-00144f
eabdcO.html.
208. For further analysis on energy transit issues. see Viadimir Rakhmanin,
Transportation and Transit of Energy and Multilateral Trade Rules: WTO and Enery Charter,
in GLOBAL CHALLENGES AT THE INTERSECTION OF TRADE, ENFRY AN) THF
ENVIRONMENT 123-27 (joost Paiwelyn ed., 2010).
209. GATT, supra 200, art. 5(2), at 9.
210. What is more, Article V:2 expressly requires that the "most convenient" route
for international transit be made available to such goods. See Report of the Panel,
Colombia-Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Enty, 1[ 7.275. W('O/DS366/R
(Apr. 29, 2009) (holding that restrictions on the number of Colombian ports permitted
to receive certain imports amounted to a restriction unjustified under Artick XI given
that it had had a 'liniting effect' on trade). What is 'most convenicnt' under Artice V:2
is far from clear. Presumably this means whatever route is most convenient to the
intrcsts of international trade actors rather than to the intcerets of the host-transit
State. See Danae Azaria, Eer Transit under the Energy Charter Treaty and the General
Agremet on Tarjf ad Tade, 27 J. ENERW & NAT. RESU RCFS L 559, 570-74 (2009)
(highlighting this ambiguity). Azaria-quoting Lauterpacht-refcrs to the notion of
freedom to transit-bc it found in treaty or custon-as part of a broader law of
peace/public international law concept relating to freedom of transit and to
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this right extends to transit through infrastructures that are
fixed to the territory of WTO members.211 Russian gas imports
into the EU flow principally through fixed infrastructure in
Ukraine. Fixed infrastructure is quite unlike mobile means of
transportation for obvious reasons and we consider that, on
balance, it is currently outside the scope of GATT Article V.
Freedom of transit under ECT Article 7, however, includes
transit through fixed infrastructures. 212 The EU and its members
along with Ukraine are parties to the ECT, while Russia had
signed-but not ratified-and has now withdrawn from the
ECT. A transit state is obligated to facilitate transit of
commodities originating from and/or destined to its WTO and
ECT peers, including, in the case of ECT peers, through fixed
infrastructure. However, whilst it is one thing to assert that
Ukraine-or any other state under ECT obligations-is legally
communication. Id. at 561. Lothar Ehring and Yulia Selivanova in RFGL ATION OF
ENERGY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE lAW: WTO, NAFTA, AND ENEREN CHARTER (Yulia
Selivanova cd., 2012), refer to freedom of transit as a controversial notion that cannot
be held to reflect customary law. They argue this is because States have frequently
included transit provisions in their bilateral treaties, which suggests the absence of a
freedom of transit provision in customary law. Id. at 51-52.
211. Cossy argues that there is nothing in the wording to suggest that
transportation via fixed structures is excluded under Artile V. She refers to the express
exclusion in Ar ticle V of aircraft in transit and therefore seeks to argue-presumably,
along the lines of the interpretative notion of expressio unias est exclusio alterius, that
transit through fixed structures is within the scope of Article V. See Mircillk Cossy,
Energy Transport and Transit in the WTO, in GLOBAL CHALLENGLS AT THL INTERSLCTION
OF TRADE, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENTl13, 115 (Joost Pauwelyn ed., 2010).
However, Azaria argues more persuasively that, whilst Article 7 ECT applies to such
structures, Artidce V GATT does not. Azaria, supra note 210. at 560. ECT Ar ticle 7. on its
own strength, mandates ECT contracting parties-who incidentally are also
GATT/WTO parties-to facilitatc transit including via fixed pipes. See ECT, supra note
189, art. 7§10(b). The fact that all ECT parties are also lk7O members does not mean
that the later ECT is capable alone in influencing the interpretation of the earlier
GATT; nor does it mean that the interpretation of GATT Artidce V is static: the law of
treatics governs interpretation of lkgal obligations flowing from inter-StatC agreements,
and there is an elaborate set of applicable rules and principles that may be at play. See
Vicnna Convention on the Law of Treaties. art.31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(largely codifying customiary law relating to treaty interpretation). Conversely, the
earlier GATT influences the interpretation of the later ECT given that there is express
systemic reference in ECT (ECT Article 4 and passim) mandating non-derogation from
GATT. Incidentally, there are 100 ncntions of the (ATT in the ECT.
212. See ECT, supra note 192, art.7§10(b). The ECT's more detailed approach to
energy transit than that in the 1W10 system is not surprising as the ECT could be
viewed as tie cnergy-specific agreement that arose out of the aborted atteflmpt to get an
energy-specific agreement concluded within the auspices of the WTO.
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obligated to facilitate transit and to refrain from placing
restrictions, it is quite another, to say that transit/transportation
operators-e.g., fixed infrastructure private operators-are
obligated to perform their contractual duties and to continue
facilitating energy flows in cases where a dispute arises between
the private actors involved and where their contractual
agreements do not otherwise mandate.21
The Kremlin clearly views the exploration of its energy
endowments as beneficial for Russia on its path to its
development214 and possibly as a means to its return to being a
machtpolitik global player. In this respect, put simply, the EU's
interests lie in getting more goods to markets. It does this by,
amongst other things, promoting measures to that end such as
promoting market liberalization, foreign investment protection
globally and regionally, by supporting calls for energy
subsidies2I to be rolled back (given that these could be seen as
potentially encouraging inefficient energy use and as creating
anticompetitive conditions). On the other hand, Russia's
interests lie in retaining as much control over all aspects of its
enormous energy endowments as possible, whilst also securing
213. We make this point because we feel it is important to bear in mind that many
operators in the global encrgy markets are also private law subjects. bC they private
international energy companies or State energy companies. And that price and service-
related disputes, whilst potentially harinful to cncrgy security of States by causing
enertgy supply disruptions, could originate in disputcs betwecn private actors.
214. An interesting fact cited Pogoretskyy and Behn is that Putin's doctoral thesis
mcntioned thc importance of using thc energy sector as a State monopoly with a view
to fueling thc cconomic dcvelopment of Russia and rcturing it to thc position of a
global superpower. POGORETSKW& BEHN, supra note 39, at 7-8.
215. In terms of cncrgy subsidies in thc EU and abroad, thc Commission
recommends that EU action, including cxternal action, also seck to discouragc energy
subsidies which it deems as contributing to inefficient energy use. See Energy Supply,
supra notc 108. at 2. This is consistcnt with the cfforts of G-8 and the G-20 that have set
energy policy priorities, including in rclation to hydrocarbon subsidies. See G20 Los
Cabos Summit, june 18-19, 2010, Policy Commitments by G20 Members 1 (2012), available
at http://www.g20.org/imnages/stories/docs/g20/)conclu/Policy_(olmiteLcnts
By_G20_Members.pdf (listing com mitelcnts. wherc. amongst othe rs, Aigentina plcdges
to reduce household energy subsidies, presumably to make more oil available on global
markets). See IEA, OPEC. OECD. World Bank Joint Report, Analysis ofthe Scope ofEnerg
Subsidies and Suggestions for the G-20 Latitie Prepared for Submission to the G-20 Summit
Meeting, Toronto (Canada, 26 -27 June 2010, at 6 (June 16, 2010), alable at
http://www.ocedoIg cnv/45575666.pdf; see also Pittsburgh Summit, Sept. 24-25, 2009,
Leaders' Statement, 1 24 (Sept. 25 2009) (suggesting their dcsire to rationalize and
phase out in fossil thel subsidies).
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the export markets it relies on to obtain the constant flow of
hard currency necessary to update and develop further its
upstream and downstream infrastructure and capacity. 6
We have discussed the polarizing effect that the prospect of
closer-more institutionalized-relations between the EU and
Russia has on the EU membership. Some EU members may see
in Russia a capricious partner, while others see a reliable energy
supplier. As mentioned above, about a third of EU gas comes
from Russia. The Nord Stream pipeline would allow for this to
come under the North Sea whilst the South Stream would allow
this to come under the Black Sea to Bulgaria and beyond. Other
gas pipelines are being constructed to establish the EU's
southern gas corridor-including the trans-Anatolian (TANAP)
pipeline crossing Turkey, and pipelines between Turkey and
Austria (Nabucco), " and Greece and Italy (ITIG)-to support
EU security of supply and to increase import volumes. However,
in spite of diversifying supply, it is unlikely that EU dependency
on Russian gas imports will lessen.218
216. At an EU-Russia summit (Dec. 21, 2012), the Russian President, Putin,
defended Russia's practice of linking the price of gas to oil, and its opposition to
extending market liberalization norms to its fixed infrastructure through the inclusion
of specific terms in the renewed EU-Russia Paritnership and Cooperation Agreement.
See Putin Slams Barroso: "You know You are wrong, you're guity," ELRACTIV (Dec. 21,
2012), http://wNy.euractiv.com/energy/putin-barroso-right-guilty-news-51(6827?utrn
souirccEurActiv% 2ONewslettcr&uticampaign-bc497cc398-newslettCr cncrgy
&utLn medium cinail: see also Press Statement by the President of the European
Council Herman van Rompuy Following the 30th EU-Russia Summit, Brussels
European Council (Dec. 21, 2012), available at http://www.consiliui.curopa.cu/
ucdocs/cmsData/docs/pressdata/cn/cc/134546.pdf (suinmarizing statement of the
President of the European Council on the EU-Russia Summit of 21 December 2012).
217. A slight variation of the Nabucco project excludes Turkey. It is called
Nabucco-Ve st and connects to TANAP. See Vladimir Socor, Nabucco-IVest in Syner ywith
Trans-Anatolia Project, EURASIA DAITY MONITOR (May 11, 2012, 5:17 PM),
http://wwwjamestown.org/singlc/?no cachc=1&tx Ltnews%/5Btt news% 5D=39364.
218. See excerpts from an inteiview with Professor Jonathan Stern with analyses in
relation to EU and Russia gas relations that seem to support this view. On the South
Stream, Stern states that: 'Across much of Europe, including the European
Commission, the South Stream [i.e.. the pipeline constructed by Russia to bring gas
into the EU market via the Black Sea and Bulgaria] was always regarded as a blufT in
order to keep the Nabucco [thc pipeline intended to carry Caspian State gas imports
into the EU to also weaken EU dependence on Russia] from being built. I've never
regarded it as a bluff, because the Russians do not play poker, they play chess." Europe'
Biggest Gas Supplier: No Bluffing, NAT. GAS EUROPL (Dec. 3, 2012),
htp://wwwnatuiraigascurope.co/curopes-biggcst-gas-supplicr-no-bluffing. On the
reliability of Russia, Stern stated that: "There are many reasons why these pipelines
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The geostrategic considerations in relation to the global
energy economy, its governance, and global energy security are
complex219 We have neither attempted nor intended to provide
a full rundown of these considerations. However, what we have
sought to do is provide some insights into the sort of
considerations and realities that impact the energy interests and
security of the EU and its member states.
COACLUSION
In modern times, energy impacts almost every field of
human endeavor. This 'centrality' has implications for policy-
making given that it cuts across a range of matters. Developing
an energy policy that is cohesive and sympathetic to a wide
range of policy objectives is hard enough for unitary actors, let
alone for the EU that must mediate between the interests of its
28 member states. As energy cuts across a numerous policy
fields-some of which fall within the existing EU competence
remit-the complexities of EU energy policy-making become
ever more apparent. Setting aside questions of EU competence,
energy within the EU context complicates EU policy
development due to the hugely disparate energy realities
between member states. These differences, as alluded to in
[i.e., those built to bring non-Russian gas into the EU market] have taken a long time
to happen and haven't happened yet, but if you're in Central & Eastern Europe, your
question is 'Look. I'm tired of talking about this-I want something to happen'. By
contrast the Russians are going to build their pipeline and it looks like they're going to
build it now." Id. On the non-feasibility of a Southern Corridor, Stern states that: "The
problem that all the Caspian Southern Corridor pipelines have had is, there is not
enough gas for those pipelines. There are huge gas reserves in a range of Caspian and
Central Asian countries and we know all about them, but reserves don't make
deliverable gas. The only deliverable gas we have from the Southern Corridor before
2020 is 10 billion cubic metres (and maybe less) of Shah Deniz gas from kerbaijan-
thats not enough to build a brand new, large scale pipeline. Its enough for the scaled
down Nabucco or the TAP lines, but it's not enough gas on which to base a major new
pipeline system."ld.
219. For a thorough analysis, see generally SUBHES C. 1HATTACHAR1Y4, ENERGY
ECONOMICS: CONCEPTS, ISSUES, MARKETS, AND GOVERNANCE (2011); Ann Florini, &
Benjamin K. Sovacool, 1Wo Governs Energy? The Challenges Facing Global Energy
Governance, 37 ENLRGY POL'Y 5239 (2009): Ann Florini & Benjamnin K. Sovacool,
Bridging the Gaps in Global Ene Governance, 17 GLOBAL GOVLRNANCL 57 (2011);
Arunabha Ghosh, Seeking Cohere in Complexity? The Governance ofEnergy by Trade &
Investment lInstitutions,2 GLOBAL POL'Y 106-19 (2011); Benjamnin Sovacool & Ann
Florini, Examnn the Complications of Global Energy Governance, 30 J. ENERGY & NAT.
RESOURCES 1. 235 (2012).
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section II of this paper, make the adoption of common positions
and policies particularly sticky.
A further factor that comes to compound EU energy policy
development is the inescapable politics of energy. Energy
resources are highly desirable due to their scarcity,
exhaustibility, and highly patchy global distribution. Scarcity
coupled with desirability leads to intense competition, and
armed conflict even, for control. All economies rely on a steady
and secure supply of energy, and disruptions can have
considerable human and economic implications. In that sense,
the very nature of energy resources politicizes energy and
energy relations. In the case of the EU, the legacy of the past has
also compounded the difficulties surrounding consensus
building. For instance, whilst some states regard more
integrated relations with an important energy partner such as
Russia to be desirable, others would baulk at this prospect.
As we have said, certain matters that energy engages
currently fall within the EU competence remit. Others do not.
Again, even for matters that fall within the EU competence
remit, some may be matters on which the EU is exclusively
competent, whilst others are matters on which the EU shares
competence with its member states. Other energy related
matters outside the EU competence remit are the sole preserve
of EU member states qua sovereign entities. This arrangement
seems to preserve the most acute political/ diplomatic aspects of
energy within the discretion of EU member states, to delegate
the less acute political aspects of energy to a process which
involves intensified systematized cooperation between the EU
member states through EU institutions, and to entirely assign
the least acute political aspects of energy to the EU institutions
to the exclusion of EU member states. We have also seen that
where there is sufficient political will between the 28 members
to legislate or otherwise develop policy that engages matters
outside the EU competence framework, this must be done on
the basis of unanimity. What is more, as we have seen in section
III of this paper, the more acute a matter for which the EU has
competence (be it shared or exclusive), the more likely it is that
related decisions must be reached on the basis of unanimity
between the EU member states in the EU institutions.
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Vhilst some might tend to view the EU-in terms of the
size of its economy, its energy needs, and its industrialization
levels-as similar to comparable net energy importing
economies, e.g., the US, in reality, the EU is geologically,
structurally, and geostrategically quite unlike the US and other
economies. The EU lacks what the other actors might take for
granted: namely, actorship flowing from sovereign state status.
That is to say, whilst it possesses the necessary international legal
personality"") to contract certain international agreements221 and
pursue certain external relations, it can only do so to the extent
that it has expressly been granted powers by EU member states
to do so.2'2 That said, however, we have also seen that in the
absence of such powers, the EU may take action so long as there
is sufficient political will between its entire membership to
unanimously sanction use of Article 352 TFEU to pursue some
common approach that is not otherwise expressly sanctioned by
the treaties upon which the EU rests.
A further factor that conditions EU energy-related action is
the requirement that action be in line with the guiding
principles contained in Article 21§1 TEU. We have briefly
referred to calls to delink EU energy security from other
considerations including those relating to environmental and
human rights. Conceivably, hard economic matters could push
the respective economic and political elites in EU member states
to consider what we deem to be regressive steps such as
reforming the EU to focus on the hard economic matters of
cooperation and to shed its more enlightened aspects
underpinned by the EU's humanist ideals. A 2010 Commission
communication included three scenarios for economic growth
220. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 8, art. 47, 2010 0.J. C 83at 41 (endowing the EU
with kgal personality); see also Rafael Leal-Arcas, EU Legal Personality in Foreign Policy ?,
24 B.U. INT'L L.J. 165 (2006).
221. Title V (Articles 216-19) of TFEU provisions delineate general EU capacity
to contract international agreements. TFEU, supra note 4, art. 216-19, 2010 OJ. C 83 at
144-47. Artidce 8 TEU relates to international agreeincnts between the EU and third-
party States aimed at 'establishing an area of prosperity and good neighborliness', and
TEU Article 37 relates to international agreements between the EU and third-party
States in relation to TEU Chapter 2 matters (regarding the Common Foreign and
Security P'olicy of the EU). TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 8, art 8, 37, 2010 0.J. C 83 at
20, 36.
222. Namely, by AlLicles 3 and 4 TFEU. See TFEU, supra note 4, arts. 3-4. 2010
0j. C 83 at 51-52.
2013] 1299
1300 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 36:1225
by 2020, two of which made less sanguine predictions: the
second scenario foresaw a sluggish recovery, whilst the third
scenario foresaw or a lost decade for economic growth.M> The
prospect of these scenarios could give rise to anti-EU sentiments
and harden anti-EU attitudes on the assumption that 'Brussels's
red tape' economically stifles the EU. Foreseeably, this could
lead to all sorts of developments such as the weakening or, even,
the collapse of the Eurozone,2" 4 and the downgrading or
abandonment of more humanist and idealistic aspects, so that
the EU is stripped down to its EEA fundamentals. We have seen
calls from high-profile UK politicians for the UK to seek a
relationship with the EU similar to that of Norway and
Switzerland.25  The EnC illustrates how single-sector
integration-minus the softer, more enlightened EU desiderata
around civil, social, and political rights-could be the way
forward for those who want to preserve the common market and
customs union whilst shedding what they might deem the softer,
less necessary bits of the EU project. This would be particularly
appealing to an EU polity that may want to engage in energy
diplomacy without the conditionality posed by the EU's 'guiding
principles' under Article 21 TEU and under other provisions
that promote consistency and cohesion across the EU policy
spectrum. This, of course, would be a tremendously regressive
step if it were to happen. However, the persistent global
economic crisis has had budgetary implications in that public
services are being scaled back across a number of EU member
states. At the EU level, this dynamic might find expression in the
paring down of the EU to its strict economic essentials.
Finally, our intention has been, on the one hand, to present
the limitations at play when the EU seeks to move in unison in
223. See Europe 2020, supra note 13, at 9. The Commission posits three scenarios
for Europe by 2020. Scenario 1 (sustainable recovery) cnvisages the EU to be able to
make a full return to the earlier growth path and to raise its potential to go beyond
that. Scenario 2 (sluggish recovery) envisages that the EU will have suffered a
permanent loss in wealth and start growing again from this eroded basis. Scenario 3
(lost decade) portends the EU will have suflered a permanent loss in wealth and
potential for future growth. See also id. at 20 (warning against the risks of economic
nationalismn).
224. That is to say, the Economic and Monetary Union among 17 EU member
states.
225. See Boris Johnson Calls for Pared Down' EU Relationship, BBC (Dec. 4 2012),
http://wwv.bbc.co.uk/newvs/iik-politics-20592596.
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relation to the collective energy security of its members, whilst,
on the other, to highlight the dynamism with which the EU
functions when there is sufficient political will to do so. We
conclude that, whilst the EU is restricted from acting the way a
sovereign actor such as China or the US would in promoting its
energy security, it makes good and full use of its existing
competences by handing its energy needs comprehensively. We
say this because the EU has a comprehensive energy policy that
seeks to address internal and external aspects of energy security
whilst also taking energy and its implications-e.g., on the
environment, on the economy and so on-as being interlinked
and therefore as meriting a cohesive response. We have also
sought to provide insights into the breadth of EU energy-related
policy and to use this as an example to highlight how questions
around competences are invariably most pertinent when we
consider energy security within the EU context.
